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Abstract
This thesis makes three novel critical theoretical interventions in the medical humanities.
The first uses Benjamin’s critical theory of art in the age of its technological
reproducibility to reveal that the evidence-based biomedical model’s primary function is
not to cure patients, but to prescribe politics. The technological reproducibility of
evidence-based biomedicine transforms medicine so it can no longer perceive—
or encounter—patients as unique, whole, and above all situated beings. The second
intervention uses Sara Ahmed’s feminist phenomenology to theorize ethical encounters
between medicine and its “others”—patients and literature—in such a way that
particularizes the encounter, not the other itself. This theoretical maneuver re-accounts
for unique, situated patients without essentializing them. The third intervention proposes
a medical inhumanities that recognizes what conditions produce inhumanity in
medicine’s encounters with others, like the encounter between a mentally ill refugee and
evidence-based biomedicine in Rawi Hage’s novel Cockroach.
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Lay Summary
One of the most common complaints by patients is that the medical system does not treat
them as a whole person; rather, they feel reduced to just their biological disease. This
thesis uses philosophy and literature to better understand how and why modern medicine
fails to account for the whole, ill person and proposes solutions to this problem through
the arts and humanities. More specifically, this thesis argues that modern medicine does
not recognize how a patient's illness and health is not just biological phenomenon but
also a socio-political one, and that philosophy and literature can help modern medical
practitioners recognize this.
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Preface
I do not feel my friend’s pain, but when I unintentionally cause her pain
I wince as if I hurt somewhere, and I do. Often in exhaustion I lay my
head down on her lap in her wheelchair and tell her how much I love
her, that I’m so sorry she is in so much pain, pain I can witness and
imagine but that I do not know. She says, if anyone knows this pain
besides me, it is you (and J, her lover). This is generous, for to be close
to her pain has always felt like a privilege to me, even though pain
could be defined as that which we typically aim to avoid.
Maggie Nelson, Bluets (2009), 39

Illness, like pain, could also be defined as that which we typically aim to avoid. I am
writing this introduction a mere week after being admitted to medical school—the door
into an exclusive club for those who are not only granted the privilege to be close to
illness, but also given the authority to attempt to cure those illnesses. I feel wholly
inadequate in my ability to do so. I will spend the next two years primarily studying the
basic medical sciences, followed by two years honing that knowledge in clinical settings.
While such an education may adequately prepare me to treat disease, I worry that I still
won’t be prepared to care for the people who are ill because of those diseases.1 I worry
that my medical education will not teach me what to do when I cannot cure the disease,
or when a cure is not enough. Frankly, I’m not sure that a cure is ever enough. I worry
that my medical education will obscure the privilege it is to be close to people
experiencing illness by obscuring those people beneath their diseases. I worry that I will
think of myself as the generous one—as the one offering the coveted cure—and forget
that my patients are the generous ones—the ones offering me the privilege to be close to
them and their illness. I worry that I will know my patient’s disease, but not know their
illness—what it means to be ill, how they experience illness, how illness affects their life.

1

By disease I mean a physiological dysfunction, whereas by illness I mean how the disease is experienced.
I get this simple and clear distinction between disease and illness from Havi Carel’s Phenomenology of
Illness (2016), wherein she also offers a more nuanced account of the difference between the two.
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But I also wonder if I need or should or even can know my patient’s illness in order to
care for them. Perhaps to care for my patients is to recognize their illness as that which I
witness and imagine but do not know, as Maggie Nelson does with her friend’s pain.
Perhaps it is the literature and theory I have read (and have yet to read) that will prepare
me for the privilege of caring for those who are ill. That is what the next three chapters
are really about: how and why literature and theory help me (and hopefully others) to
better care for those who are ill.

This thesis is also about the inextricable, yet oftentimes fraught and contested encounters
between the humanities and medicine. The phrase “medical humanities” was first coined
in the USA in 1948, partly as a response to the the landmark 1910 Flexner report which
“exposed a lack of adequate scientific and clinical education across many American
medical schools and recommended a root-and-branch overhaul, including the
standardization of curricula” around the integration of basic and clinical sciences
(Bleakley 12). The interdisciplinary field of medical humanities thus emerged and
remains a kind of umbrella term for research and practice that applies the arts and
humanities (and sometimes social sciences) to medicine and vice versa.2 By the 1990s,
narrative medicine developed as an especially influential approach to the medical
humanities that focused specifically on the narrative basis of medical practice and
education.3 But by the early twentieth century, debates emerged around just who and
what were excluded by the field’s focus on medicine.4 In response, the health humanities
emerged with a mission to explore “human health and illness through the methods and
materials of the creative arts and humanities” (SCOPE n.p.). What matters most for this
2

Around the same time in the mid-1990s, the history of medicine, philosophy of medicine, bioethics,
medical sociology, and medical anthropology were also developing identities of their own outside the
“umbrella” of the medical humanities. Moreover, it is important to note that none of these disciplines
(including the medical humanities) were “new” insofar as humanities scholars and artists have always been
engaged with medicine in various ways; however, the emergence of these disciplines as institutionalized
entities (e.g. with their own departments in universities, academic journals and conferences) was indeed
new to the twentieth century.
See Kathryn Montgomery Hunter’s Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge
(1991) and Rita Charon’s Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness (2006).
3

See, for example, Crawford et al. (2010) and the introduction to Jones et al.’s Health Humeanities Reader
(2014).
4
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thesis is that all these disciplines draw upon the humanities to shift the boundaries of
what constitutes medicine as a body of knowledge. Going forward, I use the phrase
“medical humanities” to refer to the myriad humanities-based methodologies and
knowledges that encounter the body of medicine in many ways. I understand medicine as
a body of knowledge in the same way feminist phenomenologist Sara Ahmed
understands philosophy: “If we think of philosophy as a body of knowledge (and like all
bodies, it is with other bodies, and with them in a certain way), then we can consider the
encounter between philosophy and its others in terms of bodily processes” (139).
Thinking of medicine in this way helps me to, first, recognize that medicine has others.
Most relevant to this thesis are patients and the humanities (specifically critical theory
and literature) as medicine’s others. Second, it helps me understand the myriad ways in
which medicine encounters its others. I am mostly concerned with how medicine often
encounters its others by practicing upon them and by reproducing, consuming, and
expelling its others. Finally, it helps me to recognize that medicine’s body is permeable
and thus can change with each encounter. This thesis explores how we might change the
body of medicine so it may encounter its others more generously, more ethically.

More specifically, this thesis argues that critical theory and literature can, in politically
necessary ways, reshape medicine’s body and the way it encounters others—but only if
one is careful about what and how critical theory and literature are used so that they are
not simply consumed. This thesis is thus ultimately a cautionary tale about how the body
of medicine is prone to consume its others. That is, how medicine can take up and fit its
others within its naturalized systems and structures, thereby reproducing the same
ideologies it has always espoused rather than being challenged to change by its others.
The first chapter offers a caution about how illness narratives can be consumed and
rendered apolitical by the technological reproducibility of evidence-based biomedicine
for its capitalistic ends; the second chapter offers a caution about how an apolitical
approach to medical ethics ends up consuming patients as fetishized, abstracted others;
and the third chapter offers a caution about how apolitically attending to patients’ stories
can risk consuming those stories into evidence-based biomedicine’s economy. Thus, the
implicit argument running throughout my thesis is that the medical humanities must be
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critical in its encounters with medicine, or risk simply being consumed by the systems
and structures of its bodies (most especially, evidence-based biomedicine). Critical theory
allows the medical humanities to critically approach the body of medicine insofar as it
pries open the systems and structures that insidiously produce power inequities, thus
opening them up for debate and intervention, rather than simply being consumed by their
naturalizing and normalizing effects.

In this way, my thesis is most closely aligned with the critical medical humanities. In the
introduction to the 2015 critical medical humanities special issue of the journal Medical
Humanities, William Viney, Felicity Callard, and Angela Woods recognize an urgent

need to reflect upon the given norms, procedures and values of our
medical humanities research community. These include but are not
exhausted by how ‘race’ and ethnicity, sexuality and gender, disability
(and madness), technology and media, economics, and social and
environmental inequalities are central to the production of medical
knowledge and to the experience of health and illness […] We are more
interested in illuminating diverse ways of doing medical humanities
that are not only sensitive to imbalances of power, implicit and explicit,
but include activist, sceptical, urgent and capacious modes of making
and re-making medicine (and those domains closely allied to it)—and
hence its ability to transform, for good and ill, the health and well-being
of individuals and societies. (3)

Following this lead, I thus want to reflect on how the medical humanities often critiques a
mere caricature of medicine (Chapter 1), deals with ethics apolitically (Chapter 2), and
assumes that attending to patients’ stories is necessarily and always ethical (Chapter 3).
Each chapter encounters medicine in politically motivated ways, and in doing so each
chapter strives to “make and re-make” the body of medicine. I began with personal
reflections that grounded this work in my ultimate desire to “transform” the health and
well-being of individuals by learning how to better care for those who are ill. But the
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project of this thesis itself is focused on reflecting upon key issues in the medical
humanities research community and offering “new ways of doing medical humanities”
that are, if not politically urgent, at least politically attuned. That project alone deserves
the full attention of this thesis (and more), so I leave the task of transforming health
through the medical humanities as a project for my future practice and research.

In the 2016 Edinburgh Companion to the Critical Medical Humanities, Angela Woods
and Anne Whitehead wonder how “the methodological and intellectual legacies of the
humanities [might] intervene more consequentially in the clinical research practices of
biomedicine – situating accounts of illness, suffering, intervention and cure in a much
thicker attention to the social, human and cultural contexts in which those accounts, as
well as the bodies to which they attend, become both thinkable and visible?” (35). This
thesis offers a series of preliminary yet hopefully pointed answers to this question. And
finding that answer requires a turn to critical theory. Viney, Callard, and Woods trace the
influence of the turn to a critical medical humanities back to “the philosophical
scepticism and political activism of the Frankfurt School, and its commitment to critical
theory as a means to form an intellectual community and bring about social change” (3). I
thus begin my thesis by using Walter Benjamin’s critical theory of art to tease apart the
political effects of evidence-based biomedicine’s technological reproducibility. The
critical medical humanities, influenced by feminist theorists like Karen Barad, has come
to understand, as Des Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard argue in the Edinburgh Companion,
that “the figures and preoccupations of the medical humanities are, in fact, deeply and
irretrievably entangled in the vital, corporeal and physiological commitments of
biomedicine” (36).5 In a very similar way, I draw upon Ahmed’s feminist theory to
understand the medical humanities as being deeply entangled in its encounters with the
body of medicine. Feminist theory runs throughout all three chapters, but is most
prominent in Chapter 2 where I use Ahmed’s phenomenology to account for difference in
the clinical encounter without essentializing that difference in the body of the patient. In
their call for an entangled critical medical humanities, Fitzgerald and Callard make sure
More specifically, the critical medical humanities draws upon Barad’s notion of agential realism as
theorized in Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007).
5
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to clarify that “an entangled medical humanities does not ask for differences to be
overcome; it asks how differences have come to matter in sickness and health; it tries to
think how their mattering might be brought into richer understanding through specific
moments of intervention” (n.p.). Throughout this thesis, I explore how differences can
“come to matter” where they have been, I argue, wrongly overcome by evidence-based
biomedicine (Chapter 1), a Levinasian-informed medical ethics (Chapter 2), and a literary
clinical encounter (Chapter 3).
The first chapter deals with the dominant model structuring medicine’s body: evidencebased biomedicine. As noted above, I use Benjamin’s critical theory of art in the age of
its technological reproducibility as a heuristic to unpack how evidence-based biomedicine
functions and to what political effects. More specifically, I argue that evidence-based
biomedicine functions through its technological reproducibility and the effect is the
withering of the patient’s aura. I understand the aura to be a medium of perception that
enables one to perceive an object or subject as uniquely situated in and out of particular
contexts. And so withering the aura is political insofar as it means that evidence-based
biomedicine cannot account for the unique, situated patient—one who is uniquely
grounded in particular contexts that are always influenced by political structures. As
such, I argue that the medical humanities must critically re-shape medicine’s body in
such a way that changes medicine’s fundamental problem of (ap)perception: that
medicine fails to realize how it perceives patients as apolitical generalized statistics and
reduced parts. If the medical humanities does not tackle this root problem, its
interventions risk simply being consumed by evidence-based biomedicine’s generalizing
gaze. I offer the wellness industry and breast cancer illness narratives as examples of how
mass interventions may be consumed by the technological reproducibility of evidencebased biomedicine.

Having outlined in greater length how evidence-based biomedicine functions and to what
effects, I move to my briefer second chapter to consider the ethics of clinical encounters
that occur within that medical model. Specifically, I interrogate a model for an ethical
clinical encounter proposed by medical humanities scholars using Emmanuel Levinas’
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philosophy. I use Ahmed’s feminist phenomenology to argue that the apolitical and
abstracted use of Levinas for medical ethics produces both patients and literature as
medicine’s fetishized others. In other words, I argue that this Levinasian model for an
ethical clinical encounter fails to account for unique, situated patients, just as the
evidence-based biomedical model does too. Instead, I argue that Ahmed’s feminist
phenomenology offers a better foundation for an ethical clinical encounter because it
allows one to account for an other’s difference (such as differences in race or ability) at
level of the encounter, rather than as an essentialized part of the other.

The third and final chapter brings the concerns of the first two chapters—evidence-based
biomedicine and the clinical encounter— together through a critical reading of the 2008
novel Cockroach by Rawi Hage. Cockroach raises fresh critical concerns for the medical
humanities as it rejects the oftentimes humanizing project of the medical humanities and,
instead, invites recognition of the narrator/patient’s inhumanity. I combine Viet Than
Nguyen’s critical theory of recognition—that one must recognize the other’s humanity
and inhumanity—with Ahmed’s feminist phenomenology to argue that humanity and
inhumanity do not exist in others, but are conditioned through encounters with others. I
then deploy this critical methodology to reveal how the encounters between the narrator
and his therapist are structured by an evidence-based biomedical economy of exchange—
the clinician holds the coveted “cure” and demands possession of the narrator’s stories
and emotions in exchange for that “cure”—and how that economy conditions the
production of inhumanity in their encounters. This chapter concludes my thesis by
bringing myself, as humanities scholar and future physician, into what I hope to be an
ethical encounter with medicine’s others (both the novel’s narrator-as-patient and the
novel itself).

7
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1

Medicine in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility
1.1

Introduction

Walter Benjamin’s seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological
Reproducibility” (1935) is rife with medical metaphors: he describes the destruction of
the aura as “symptomatic” (22), the aura as a strange “tissue” (23), and even uses surgery
as an analogy to explain how cameras function (35)—to name just a few examples. His
metaphorical use of medicine seems to invite a literal reading of medicine in the age of its
technological reproducibility. In his essay, Benjamin famously argues that the artwork’s
aura withers through its technological reproduction and that the significance of this
process “extends far beyond the realm of art” (22). In this chapter, I will extend the
significance of technological reproducibility into the realm of medicine. Thus, whereas
Benjamin is concerned with the political consequences of the technological
reproducibility of modern art destroying the artwork’s aura, I am concerned with the
political consequences of the technological reproducibility of the most hegemonic
modern medical model (evidence-based biomedicine) destroying the patient’s aura.6 My
argument, through a critical medical humanities re-reading of Benjamin’s essay, is twofold. First, I argue that evidence-based biomedicine relies upon technology—everything
from fMRIs and statistics to the highly regularized technology/techne of taking a medical
history—to reproduce highly controlled and generic medical diagnoses,
treatments/therapies, research results, and even patients.7 Second, and more urgently, I
argue that the technological reproducibility of the dominant medical model assimilates
the differences of unique, individual patients into a mass, statistically-derived patient (i.e.

6

By the aura, I understand Benjamin (through Miriam Hansen) to mean a medium that enables one to
perceive the artwork as unique and authentically situated in a particular historical, cultural, and political
context. I take up Benjamin’s aura and Hansen’s interpretation in further detail in section 1.2.1.
By the reproduction of “highly controlled and generic” patients I mean that evidence-based biomedicine
turns unique indviduals into generic statistics-as-patients who can fit into the medical model’s similarly
generic diagnostic and treatment categories. In this chapter, I argue and demonstrate how the
transformation of unique indivdiuals into generic patients is continuously reproduced by the technological
reproducibility of evidence-based biomedicine. In section 1.2.3, I use three case studies to further argue that
these generic categories are often idealogically determined, and so evidence-based biomedicine’s
reproduction of patients is actually a reproduction of (often oppressive) ideaological subjects as patients.
7
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destroys the patient’s aura) and thereby shifts the social function of evidence-based
biomedicine from curing individual patients to prescribing particular politics for mass
patient groups.

The dominant medical model is the frequent target of critique from humanities scholars,
but as medical philosopher Juliette Ferry-Danini convincingly argues, the medical
humanities often “fail[s] to give credible accounts of the model” and thus ends up
“critiquing what essentially amounts to a caricature” (58). Ferry-Danini goes on to
contend that the medical humanities’ poor conceptualization and critique of the dominant
medical model has resulted in a field that focuses too closely on the clinical encounter
and thereby misses the opportunity to intervene where it really matters: at the level of
health systems and public health (58). Doing the latter, she argues, “necessarily raises
fresh ethical and political questions, specifically regarding justice and equity” (70).8 My
critical medical humanities re-reading of Benjamin’s essay strives to do precisely what
Ferry-Danini outlines: I use Benjamin’s theory of art in the age of its technological
reproduction as a heuristic for better conceptualizing and critiquing the dominant medical
model in such a way that reveals its political function, thereby raising “fresh ethical and
political questions.”

1.1.1

A Brief History of Modern Medicine

By the late nineteenth century, scientific medicine, also known as biomedicine, had
emerged. In his 2017 PhD dissertation “The New Medical Model: Chronic Disease and
Evidence-based Medicine,” physician-philosopher Jonathan Fuller explains how what
changed in the twentieth century was “that physicians now received an extensive
scientific education during their training, and for the first time had a powerful therapeutic
armamentarium with which they could cure many diseases, especially acute infectious
diseases” (2). This scientific education was—and largely still is—rooted in the basic

8

In Chapter 2, I will argue that Levinasian medical ethics has also focused too closely on the clinical
encounter and thereby cannot imagine a politically just and equitable clinical encounter.
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medical sciences, which are primarily structured around organ systems and their
mechanisms of function, especially at the cellular and molecular levels. Philosopher
Miriam Solomon, in Making Medical Knowledge (2015), explains how biomedicine’s
newfound scientific basis results in reductionism, wherein diseases are “increasingly
understood in terms of organs, parts of organs, microorganisms, and biochemical
processes rather than in terms of the whole organism (as in humoral theories) or its
environment (such as miasmas)” (6). This biomedical model uses mechanistic reasoning
based upon this reductionist scientific knowledge to cure patients. Biomedicine seeks
cures and is thereby best equipped to deal with acute diseases that can be cured, unlike
chronic illnesses. In Bounding Biomedicine: Evidence and Rhetoric in the New Science of
Alternative Medicine (2016), Colleen Derkatch lays out how “contemporary Western
medicine is shaped predominantly by the biomedical model” (8). In doing so, Derkatch
quotes medical anthropologist Howard Stein to explain that while biomedicine is not a
fixed model, it is generally characterized by “rational, scientific, dispassionate, objective,
professional judgement” (8). These characteristics go on to also characterize evidencebased medicine, perhaps to an even greater extent.

By the late twentieth century, the emergence of evidence-based medicine (EBM) sought
to replace the mechanistic reasoning and clinical judgement of the biomedical model. The
most frequently cited definition of evidence-based medicine comes from the founders
themselves in their seminal 1996 article in the British Medical Journal: “Evidence-based
medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett et al. 71). EBM has since
established a hierarchy of evidence wherein systematic reviews of double-blinded
randomized controlled trials are considered the “best” kind of evidence, while
mechanistic reasoning and clinical judgements based on experience are some of the
“worst.” Fuller describes how scientific reasoning under the biomedical model relied
upon basic science knowledge, whereas scientific reasoning under the evidence-based
model relies upon the science of clinical epidemiology: “mechanistic thinking has been
supplanted by statistical and probabilistic reasoning, and scientific expertise has come to
reflect the ability to critically appraise epidemiological studies in addition to the

10

11

possession of an impressive store of biomedical knowledge” (5). As such, doctors must
now first consider how a population of patients fared in a study and then apply those
results to their individual patient. In this way, EBM does not replace the entire
biomedical model, it just supplants its previous mode of reasoning (mechanistic) with a
new one (epidemiological) that is supposed to be even more “rational, scientific,
dispassionate, objective.” While EBM seeks to resolve many problems with the previous
biomedical model (most significantly its unreliable mode of reasoning), it also
exasperates many of biomedicine’s foundational problems (e.g. a fallacious sense of
objectivity, reductionism, a focus on acute diseases) and even creates a new problem: the
“unresolved conflict between the essentially case based nature of clinical practice and the
mainly population based nature of the research evidence” (Derkatch 108).

The hegemonic medical model we are left with today is a mix of both the biomedical and
evidence-based models: evidence-based biomedicine. I argue that this model cannot
account for unique, individual patients for two reasons: first, because biomedicine
reduces the whole patient into parts and, second, because evidence-based medicine
focuses almost exclusively on statistics and populations. The biomedical side of the
model penetrates too far into the patient—deep into the organs, tissues, cells, and even
molecules—and the evidence-based side of the model focuses too far beyond the
patient—out into the realm of mass populations and abstract statistical analyses of such
populations.9 Both processes, while opposite in some ways, rely upon the technological
reproducibility of medicine to achieve the same effect: the loss of the unique, individual
patient—the destruction of the patient’s aura. Over the same century that evidence-based
biomedicine rose to prominence, several other medical models also gained traction as
patients, physicians, and even researchers sought ways to account for the unique,
individual patients that were otherwise made to conform to evidence-based biomedicine.
These other medical models are roughly identified as patient-centred care,
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My second chapter is also concerned with the chasm between the wide view of illness (at the level of
populations and systems) and the narrow view of illness (at the level of the intimate clinician-patient
encounter). But whereas this chapter reveals how this chasm is produced by the modern medical model, my
second chapter reveals how this chasm is produced in medical ethics.
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complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), and the medical humanities, although
all three frequently overlap.10 While I do consider patient-centred care and CAM later on,
I am mostly concerned with the medical humanities. We can only imagine effective ways
for these other medical models to intervene in the scene of problems created by evidencebased biomedicine if we first understand—in a nuanced and robust way—what evidencebased biomedicine is, how it functions, and what its effects are. I am specifically using
Benjamin’s critical theory of art to do so, but I am also arguing more broadly for a turn to
continental philosophy and critical theory in general to understand, critique, and then
intervene in evidence-based biomedicine.

1.1.2

The (Analytic) Philosophy of Medicine: A Problem of
Methodology

Philosophers of medicine are increasingly concerned with analyzing models of medical
research and practice, especially since the advent of evidence-based medicine in the mid1990s (Reiss and Ankeny 2016).11 While the philosophy of medicine has revealed many
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The evidence-based biomedical model is structured around disease, whereas the patient-centred care
model is structured around the patient. That is, evidence-based biomedicine is practiced on a disease in a
passive patient’s body, whereas patient-centred care is practiced with patients who are actively involved in
their own care (Derkatch 110). Evidence-based biomedicine provides medical care that is standardized by
select accredited institutions, like the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada.
Complementary medicine provides medical care alongside the standardized care offered by evidence-based
biomedicine, whereas alternative medicine provides medical care instead of the standard. CAM is
mobilized as an umbrella term to encompass a “disparate range of health practices such as chiropractic,
energy healing, herbal medicine, homeopathy, meditation, naturopathy, and traditional Chinese medicine”
(Derkatch 1). Finally, the evidence-based biomedical model derives knowledge from science to understand
disease, whereas the medical humanities derives knowledge from the arts and humanities to understand
illness.
11

Philosophers have been concerned with topics in medicine (like death and pain) for centuries, but the
“philosophy of medicine” only emerged as its own field—distinct from philosophy in general and
philosophy of science in particular—within the past few decades. There are now journals and professional
organizations dedicated to the philosophy of medicine, making it a robust academic field in its own right.
Some topics that are central to the philosophy of medicine include: definitions and categories of health and
disease, clinical judgement, evidence-based medicine and randomized control trials, medical theories and
explanations, animal models in therapy development, and values in medical research (Reiss and Ankeny
2016).
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methodological problems in medical research and practice, it has yet to be reflexive about
its own methodological limits. I contend that one such limit is politics: the philosophy of
medicine’s almost exclusive reliance upon analytic philosophy has resulted in a
methodology that cannot effectively account for the political concerns of modern
medicine. Jonathan Fuller, for example, explores two facets of what he calls the “new
medical model”: chronic disease care and evidence-based medicine. Fuller identifies
several problems in this “new medical model” and argues that such problems are
“intimately connected” to philosophical concerns (ii). But Fuller makes sure to
nevertheless supplement his philosophical methodology with medical case studies and
primary medical literature because while “medicine is messy and fleshy, philosophy is
neat and abstract” (16). By setting up this opposition between medicine and philosophy,
Fuller reproduces some of the same problems he identifies in medicine: his
characterization of philosophy is reductive and takes analytic philosophy for granted as
philosophy in general, in much the same way that modern medicine is reductive and takes
evidence-based medicine for granted as medicine in general. Not all philosophy is neat
and abstract, and especially not continental philosophy and critical theory.
Phenomenology, for example, is very much “fleshy” and nearly all critical theory is more
“messy” than “neat.”12

More specifically, Fuller “restrict[s] his analysis to conceptual, metaphysical and
epistemic problems of medicine and bracket[s] a discussion of ethical problems” because
“the ethical problems of medicine have received far more attention” (19-20). It is indeed
true that the philosophy of medicine has focused largely on medical ethics, but the
discipline’s treatment of ethics has been mostly apolitical. I argue that such an apolitical
approach to medical ethics is inevitable when the philosophy of medicine is so heavily
In his chapter on “The Intertwining—The Chiasm” in The Visible and the Invisible (1968), Maurice
Merleau-Ponty develops his ontology of “flesh”—that which connects the sensing body with the sensed
object—as part of his greater phenomenological project. Merleau-Ponty offers the most explicit and famous
example of how “fleshy” phenomenology is, but phenomenology in general is “fleshy” insofar as it
accounts for an embodied and hence fleshed subject. And critical theory is “messy” insofar as it challenges
the “neat” categories that structure society. Critical theories take on the “messy” task of providing “the
descriptive and normative bases for social inquiry aimed at decreasing domination and increasing freedom
in all their forms” (Bohman 2016).
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reliant upon an analytical philosophical methodology; analytic philosophy is limited in its
ability to grapple with the “messy” and “fleshy” concerns of politics. The divorcing of
ethics from politics in the philosophy of medicine is untenable because so many ethical
concerns in medicine arise from political contexts. For example, sexist and racist biases
against women’s supposed low tolerance for pain and black people’s supposed inability
to feel pain result in significant underdiagnosing and under-treating of these patient
groups—both of which are serious ethical concerns.13 As such, I return to the question of
medical ethics through continental philosophy to begin grappling with the ethicalpolitical consequences of the evidence-based biomedical model.

But before we can even begin to grapple with the political consequences of the medical
model, we must be able to recognize that evidence-based biomedicine is doing political
work in the first place. This is a challenge because, as Derkatch reveals, the evidence in
EBM “seems to speak for itself, divorced from human agency and social context. This
evidence appears to determine objectively, through numeric values, whether any given
health intervention is safe and effective […] evidence-based medicine can affect
boundary work without seeming to do so at all” (24). Derkatch deploys a rhetorical
analysis of relevant medical journals to denaturalize EBM’s professional boundary work.
But EBM does not simply demarcate professional boundaries; it also demarcates political
ones and, as such, demands a kind of analysis—like Benjamin’s critical theory of art—
that can denaturalize the political work EBM does. Derkatch even describes the evidence
of EBM in much the same way as Marxist commodity fetishism: the evidence is
“divorced from human agency and social context” just as the fetishized commodity is
divorced from its material and social relations (e.g. the factory worker who produced it
and the conditions under which he worked).14 Evidence as commodity fetish is precisely
13

For studies on sexism and pain treatment, see: Calderone 1990, Hoffman and Tarzian 2001, and Chen et
al. 2008. For studies on racism and pain treament, see: Ezenwa and Fleming 2012, Goyal et al. 2015, and
Hoffman et al. 2016.
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In the first chapter of Capital, Marx famously theorizes the process of commodity fetishism. He states:
“the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have
absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of
this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the
fantastic form of a relation between things […] the products of the human brain appear as autonomous
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the kind of object that critical theory is best equipped to analyze.15 Derkatch also
importantly reminds us that the push for quantitative research methods (like EBM) after
the birth of scientific medicine didn’t come from practitioners themselves, but from
“regulatory authorities who sought to establish ‘uniform and rigorous standards’ of
practice and so viewed physicians’ expertise, rooted in experience, as a ‘valuable and
dangerous commodity’” (37). This is an important reminder that the privileging of
quantitative methods in the dominant medical model was not simply fuelled by a desire
for “objective” and “rigorous” scientific evidence, but rather, politically motivated. As
such, critiques of this medical model must account for such politics.

Similarly, Solomon observes that both patients and physicians have reacted on political
terms against evidence-based medicine and scientific medicine generally:

the criticism is that clinical guidelines—based on evidence-based
medicine or consensus conferences—do not treat patients as individuals
and devalue the importance of the physician-patient relationship. There
is also concern, especially in the US, that such clinical guidelines are
the first step toward increased medical regulation by bureaucratic
organizations such as the government, health insurance companies, and
the legal profession (3-4).

figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the
human race [...] I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are
produced as they are produced as commodities” (164-5). Marx goes on to argue that the fetishized
commodity—as an “autonomous figure” with a life of its own—enters into a particular relation with the
human, and that relation is an oppressive one wherein the commodity, not the workers who produced it,
holds power. In a similar way, evidence is now an autonomous figure with a life of its own that enables it to
hold power. Under the evidence-based model, it is no longer medical researchers, practitioners, and
educators who have power and authority over patients, but the evidence itself. And that evidence is
oftentimes oppressive to patients, as I explore in section 1.2.3.
In my second chapter, I use Sara Ahmed’s critical theory to analyze how the patient is also produced as a
fetish in the clinical encounter.
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It is no coincidence that these two concerns—the loss of the individual patient and
increased medical regulation—emerge together in reaction to the hegemonic medical
model. Solomon’s analytic philosophical methodology effectively identifies these two
concerns, but does not adequately account for how the former results in the latter. My
critical medical humanities re-reading of Benjamin’s theory of art will reveal how
political regulation is an inevitable and even inherent consequence of the loss of the
unique, individual patient under the evidence-based biomedical model. Derkatch and
Soloman’s observations reveal how the dominant medical model both emerged from and
results in politics and so our critiques of the model must be able to account for politics.
This is why it is so crucial for the philosophy of medicine—and the medical humanities
in general—to look beyond just analytic philosophy.

1.2
1.2.1

The Politics of Technological Reproducibility
The Technological Reproducibility of Medicine and its Aura

To begin: what exactly do I mean by the technological reproducibility of evidence-based
biomedicine? I mean that the clinical diagnoses, therapies, and outcomes offered by this
medical model are reproducible across patients, rather than unique to particular patients.
That is: masses of patients who share signs and symptoms are offered the same diagnosis
and therapy, which is then expected to result in the same clinical outcomes. And this
reproducibility is achieved through the use of technologies, such as stethoscopes and
fMRIs that detect the signs and symptoms used to diagnose patients, the pharmaceutical
drugs used to treat the diagnosis, and even the techne of using medical charts to record
the patient’s progression from diagnosis to treatment to outcome. The technological
reproducibility of medical practice is sustained by the technological reproducibility of
medical research and education. The reliability of medical research (and scientific
research in general) is based upon its reproducibility—whether the study’s results can be
reproduced. Statistics and randomized control trials are the primary technologies used by
medical researchers to achieve reproducible/reliable results. These results are then used
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as the “best evidence” to develop guidelines for medical practice and education. Medical
learners are taught to use medical technologies—from stethoscopes and ultrasounds to
statistically-derived evidence and medical charts—in highly regularized ways according
to the technologically reproducible results of medical research in order to achieve
technologically reproducible diagnoses, therapies, and outcomes in their patients. As
such, the evidence-based biomedical model is not simply technologically reproducible
but is actually designed for reproducibility, just as “the work [of art] reproduced becomes
the reproduction of a work designed for reproducibility” (24, italics added). That is,
evidence-based biomedical medicine is designed to be technologically reproducible in
practice, research, and education. The technological reproducibility of evidence-based
biomedicine is hailed for its scientific rigour, but achieving this rigour also sacrifices the
patient’s aura.

My understanding of Benjamin’s concept of the aura comes from my own reading of
Edmunch Jephcott and Harry Zohn’s English translation of the second version of the
work of art essay and Miriam Hansen’s 2008 essay on “Benjamin’s Aura,” wherein she
interprets the aura through a wide selection of Benjamin’s writings, including the second
version of the work of art essay.16 In her essay, Hansen “defamiliarize[s] the common
understanding” of the aura as a shorthand for the singularity, authority, and authenticity,
of traditional art—a definition which she considers to be a “narrowly aesthetic
understanding of aura [that] rests on a reductive reading of Benjamin” (337-9). Instead,
Hansen argues that the aura is not inherent to the artwork, but is a medium of perception:
the aura “implies a phenomenal structure that enables the manifestation of the gaze”
(342). Hansen’s interpretation of the aura as a medium of perception allows me to take

The second version of Benjamin’s essay was written in 1936, published in Volume 7 of Benjamin's
Gesammelte Schriften (1989), and then translated to English in Volume 3 of Selected Writings, edited by
Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (2002). Although the third version (1939) of the essay (translated
by Harry Zohn in 1969 under the title “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”) has been
more widely anthologized and taken up, Jephcott and Zohn explain in the notes to their translation of the
second version that it “represents the form in which Benjamin originally wished to see the work published;
it served, in fact, as the basis for the first publication of the essay” (42). Miriam Hansen also uses the
second version of the essay for this reason and argues that a “narrow understanding of aura is particularly
pronounced” in the essay’s third version (337). The essay’s first version was published in German in 1935.
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Benjamin’s theorization beyond the aesthetics of art and into the realm of medicine,
where I will identify perception as the fundamental problem with the evidence-based
biomedical model. Furthermore, Hansen turns to the etymological connotations of aura as
Greek and Latin for “breath” and “breeze” to emphasize that the aura as a medium of
perception is not just visual: the “gazing subject is breathing, not just seeing” and like
breath, the aura is a “medium that envelops and physically connects—and thus blurs the
boundaries between—subject and object, suggesting a sensory, embodied mode of
perception” (351). Thus, through Hansen, I understand the aura as a medium that
intimately intertwines the perceiving subject with that which is perceived (e.g. an artwork
or patient) in such a way that deconstructs the hierarchical boundary between the
perceiver and the perceived. And this kind of perceptual intertwinement occurs at more
than just the visual level: it is wholly embodied and thereby fundamentally
phenomenological. This interpretation of the aura may seem to entirely collapse any
distance between the perceiver and the perceived, especially as Hansen goes on to
consider the biblical and mystical connotations of breath and breathing “to understand
that this mode of perception [the aura] involves surrender to the object as other” (351).
But surrendering to the object as other actually requires maintaining a critical distance
that does not appropriate, colonize, nor fetishize the other—that allows one to perceive
the artwork/patient as a unique whole situated in its own particular context.17 Returning
to Benjamin’s own words allows one to better appreciate how critical this distance is to
the aura.

Benjamin famously defines the artwork’s aura as “a strange tissue of space and time: the
unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be” (23). Through Hansen, I
interpret this “strange tissue” as a medium that enables one to phenomenologically
perceive the artwork/patient as unique and at a distance necessary to perceive the

Hansen’s phenomenological understanding of the aura as a mode of perception that “surrenders” to the
other is highly evocative of Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenological descriptions of ethically encountering
the other as other. I take this up again in Chapter 2 as I critique how Levinas’ phenomenology has been
used to produce a medical ethic that does indeed risk appropriating, colonizing, and fetishizing the patient
as the other. Instead, I use Sara Ahmed’s feminist phenomenology to bring a critical distance back to the
ethical clinical encounter.
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artwork/patient as a whole situated in a particular historical, cultural, and political
context. Benjamin goes on to argue that the modern masses seek to overcome this
distance and uniqueness through the technological reproduction of art; and it is this
“desire of the present-day masses to ‘get closer’ to things, and their equally passionate
concern for overcoming each thing’s uniqueness by assimilating it as a reproduction” that
withers the artwork’s aura (23). It seems particularly relevant for my present concerns
that Benjamin uses surgery as an analogy to theorize how cinematography (the epitome
of technologically reproducible art) overcomes the critical distance necessary for
maintaining the artwork’s/patient’s aura:

The attitude of the magician, who heals a sick person by a laying-on of
hands, differs from that of the surgeon, who makes an intervention in
the patient. The magician maintains the natural distance between
himself and the person treated; more precisely, he reduces it slightly by
laying on his hands, but increases it greatly by his authority. The
surgeon does exactly the reverse: he greatly diminishes the distance
from the patient by penetrating the patient’s body, and increases it only
slightly by the caution with which his hand moves among the organs. In
short: unlike the magician (traces of whom are still found in the medical
practitioner), the surgeon abstains at the decisive moment from
confronting his patient person to person; instead, he penetrates the
patient by operating.—Magician is to surgeon as painter is to
cinematographer. The painter maintains in his work a natural distance
from reality, whereas the cinematographer penetrates deeply into its
tissue. The images obtained by each differ enormously. The painter’s is
a total image, whereas that of the cinematographer is piecemeal. (35)

Benjamin emphasizes that there exists a “natural distance” between the one who
perceives (e.g. the medical practitioner) and the reality which is perceived (e.g. the
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patient). That distance is maintained by the authority of the magician18, whereas it is
overcome by the surgeon when he penetrates the patient’s body rather than encountering
his patient “person to person.” The effect of overcoming that “natural distance” is that the
surgeon can only perceive a “piecemeal” image of the patient, whereas the magician
perceived a “total image.” Overcoming that distance penetrates and hence withers the
auratic tissue of reality.

While Benjamin’s point is metaphorical, in medicine, the patient’s aura is both a literal
and figurative tissue. Literally, the patient’s aura is composed of various unique tissues
that enable one to perceive the patient’s interconnected organ systems as part of their
whole body. Figuratively, the patient’s aura is composed of the patient’s unique
experiences, circumstances, and beliefs that enable one to perceive the patient as situated
in a unique cultural, historical, and political context. Consequently, the technological
reproducibility of evidence-based biomedicine withers the patient’s aura at both the
literal and figurative levels: biomedical technologies (e.g. a surgeon’s scalpel or an
fMRI’s magnetic waves) penetrate the patient’s literal tissues in order to diagnose and
treat them according to evidence-based medical technologies (e.g. statistical analyses and
clinical trials) that assimilate the patient’s figurative tissues into generic diagnostic,
therapeutic, and risk categories. As a result, evidence-based biomedicine only perceives a
“piecemeal” image of the patient. In seeking to “get closer” to the patient through
technologically reproducible medical interventions, the evidence-based biomedical model
ends up withering the patient’s aura and thus treats a statistically-produced average
patient instead of the unique, authentic, and whole patient. As such, the technological
reproducibility of the dominant medical model, like the technological reproducibility of
modern art, “substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence” (Benjamin 22): the
unique existence of the patient is substituted by the mass existence of a statisticallyderived average patient.
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I return to explore, in detail, what Benjamin means by “authority” later in this section.
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Benjamin argues that the withering of the aura is the “signature” of a modern perception
that “extracts sameness even from what is unique” and that the transformation of
perception in modernity through technological reproduction is analogous to the
transformation of theory through its increasing reliance on statistics (23-4). Benjamin
remains vague about what kind of transformation theory has undergone through statistics,
but in medicine, the connection between statistics and perception is clear. As medicine
increasingly relies upon statistics to determine “best” practices for using its technologies
to yield reproducible results (i.e. diagnoses, therapies, and clinical outcomes), it “extracts
sameness” from what were once unique patients, but who are now perceived by medical
practitioners, researchers, and educators as statistically-produced averages. Derkatch
eloquently describes how two of the most significant technologies of evidence-basedbiomedicine—randomized control trials and statistics—“extract sameness” from unique
people, practices, and effects through variable standardization:

When variables are standardized, they are rendered similar enough to be
compared […] The numbers produced in biomedical research are emptied of their
social [and political] interest through their method of production, the randomized
control trial (RCT), which transforms a variable range of health problems,
treatments, practitioners, and patients into measurable phenomena by operating in
accordance within a set of rigid criteria and procedures. This transformation of
people, practices, and effects into measurable phenomena allows us to compare
‘disparate objects’ according to a shared metric. (32)

A once unique social and political object or subject (such as a disease or patient,
respectively) is rendered an abstract number where nearly all difference is erased so it can
be statistically compared under the evidence-based biomedical model. As a result,
patients and their diseases are perceived as statistically-analyzable data that are
fallaciously rendered asocial and apolitical.
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Benjamin argues that “just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives changes
over long historical periods, so too does their mode of perception” (23, italics original).
The problem with the hegemonic medical model is, thus, a problem of perception—of
how medical practitioners, researchers, and educators perceive unique patients as
apolitical statistical averages and reduced parts. As such, any intervention by the medical
humanities to restore the patient’s aura (i.e. the medium of perception that enables one to
perceive the patient as unique and at a distance) must tackle the root problem of
perception. Otherwise, the medical humanities’ interventions risk simply being
assimilated by the hegemonic medical model’s problematic mode of perception. In The
Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (1963), Michel Foucault
argues that the clinic is a material and discursive institution that was both the result and
manifestation of the birth of biomedicine. Clinical medicine is discursive insofar as it
produces a medical gaze that penetrates patients’ bodies to uncover the biophysiological
disease at the root of their illness, which thereby constitutes medicine’s scientific,
disease-centred knowledge base. Foucault argues that medicine exerts its power over
patients through this discursive medical gaze and hence functions ideologically. This
chapter builds upon Foucault’s work by arguing that the medical gaze replaces the auratic
mode of perception that withers due to the technological reproducibility of evidencebased biomedicine. In the age of the aura, medicine perceived the patient as a whole,
unique patient situated in a particular context; whereas in the age technological
reproducibility, evidence-based biomedicine perceives the patient in a generic, reduced,
and piecemeal way. The emergence of evidence-based biomedicine and its technological
reproducibility is a result of the birth of the clinic. That is, the clinic discursively and
materially institutionalized medical practice in such a way that enabled evidence-based
biomedicine to develop as a systematic, hegemonic, and technologically reproducible
medical model. I understand the auratic mode of perception (via Hansen) to be primarily
phenomenological, whereas I understand the medical gaze (via Foucault) to be primarily
discursive. Thus, in considering how medicine might seek to in some ways recover the
patient’s aura, I am really calling for medicine to be phenomenological in its approach to
patients. I return to this point at greater length in Chapter 2.
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1.2.2

Medicine’s Pathological Unconscious and Ritualistic Basis

Benjamin asserts that “it is through the camera that we first discover the optical
unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis”
(37). Benjamin uses the term unconscious in the psychoanalytic sense, but also more
literally to convey all that human perception cannot see when unaided by technology.
Film cameras, through technologies like optical zooms and slow-motion, enable us to see
aspects of reality that previously passed us by unconsciously. Just as film technology
opens up an optical unconscious, medical technology opens up what I call the
pathological unconscious. Benjamin describes how the film camera “brings to light
entirely new structures of matter” and this is literally true of biomedicine as biomedical
technologies bring to light previously “unconscious” structures in the human body. For
example, fMRIs have brought to light the previously “unconscious” structure of neural
networks in the brain (37). This is also true of the evidence-based side of the hegemonic
medical model: the technologies of statistical analysis and clinical trials bring to light
previously “unconscious” structures, like correlations and causal relationships, across
mass patient populations. As such, the pathological unconscious opened up by medical
technology lies both deep within the human body—at the molecular level—and far
beyond the human body—at the level of trends across populations.

Yet a crucial facet of illness still remains “unconscious” to the evidence-based
biomedical model: chronic illness. Chronic illnesses often present without any kind of
“organic” pathology or etiology that can be perceived by biomedical technologies.19

Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS) are especially “notorious” in this
regard. CFS is characterized by extreme tiredness that cannot be explained by another underlying medical
diagnosis, while FMS is characterized by widespread musculoskeletal pain that also canot be explained by
another diagnosis. The third edition of The American Psychiatric Association Publishing Textbook of
Psychosomatic Medicine and Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry states that “the history of CFS and FMS has
been notorious for disputes about whether these disorders are ‘organic’ or ‘psychogenic’.” Organic
disorders are those with a biopathological etiology that can be detected by biomedical technologies and are
usually acute, whereas psychogenic disorders have a psychological etiology that cannot be so “objectively”
detected and are usually chronic. The textbook goes on to explain how “the extreme psychological
[psychogenic] view may encourage the doctor to dismiss the patient’s symptoms as ‘all in the mind’.”
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Chronic illnesses are not well studied by evidence-based medicine either. Patients with
chronic illness often suffer from multiple diseases and patients with multiple diseases are
frequently excluded from clinical trials (Fuller 12). Moreover, chronic illnesses are not
offered much relief from biomedicine, but interpersonal care offered through alternative
medical models has been shown to help; however, evidence-based medicine does not
easily account for health interventions dependent on interpersonal care because they are
almost impossible to investigate through the “gold standard” of randomized controlled
clinical trials (Derkatch 107).20 In these ways, chronic illness still remains “unconscious”
to the evidence-based biomedical model. And this is not simply a medical problem; it is a
political one as chronic illnesses are so often the result of and/or exasperated by social
and economic inequality. Ultimately, the dominant medical model’s technologies are still
unable to capture the most marginalized in our societies because of the model’s inability
to adequately account for chronic illnesses. Patients with chronic illness are thus left to
perform in front of a medical apparatus that cannot see them or the root cause of their
illnesses: political inequity.

Recognizing the political roots of a patient’s illness requires a return to the ritualistic
basis of medicine/art. Benjamin argues that before the age of technological
reproducibility, art found its social function through ritual: “the uniqueness of the work of
art is identical to its embeddedness in the context of tradition… In other words: the
unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of art always has its basis in ritual” (24, italics
original). Benjamin argues that “whereas the authentic work retains its full authority in
the face of a reproduction made by hand, […] this is not the case with technological
reproduction” (20). That is to say, the ritual function of the auratic artwork is the artwork
asserting its authority as the authentic work of art. By authenticity, Benjamin does not
simply mean the unique existence of an original work of art; rather, authenticity “is the
quintessence of all that is transmissible in it from its origin on, ranging from its physical
Randomized control trials (RCTs) are a kind of clinical trial wherein “a population of individuals who
might benefit from a new medical treatment are [randomly] divided into a treatment group—the group
whose members receive the new treatment—and one or several control groups—groups whose members
receive either an alternative or ‘standard’ treatment or a placebo” (Reiss and Ankeny 2016). According to
the evidence-based medical model, the results of RCTs are considered to be evidence of the highest quality.
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duration to the historical testimony relating to it” (22, italics added). Thus, authenticity
and historicity are intimately intertwined for Benjamin. In “Benjamin, The Image, and
the End of History” (2016), Chiel van den Akker, drawing upon Hansen, argues that “the
aura only comes into being as a result of an attentive perceptibility, a historicizing gaze,”
which he defines as a “present awareness of [the artwork’s] existence in time, stretching
backwards into the past and possibly forwards into the (unknown) future” (48, 46).21 This
gaze makes us aware of the artwork’s authenticity (its “historical testimony”) and thereby
invests the artwork with its aura—its unique existence which “bears the mark of the
history to which the work has been subject” (Benjamin 21). Benjamin emphasizes that
“what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of
the object, the weight it derives from tradition” (22, italics added). By authority Benjamin
means the historical, cultural, and even political situatedness of the artwork. Thus by
asserting its authority as the authentic work of art, the ritual function of the art is to assert
its historical, cultural, and political situatedness. Put in terms of the perceiver/perceived
encounter, I understand art’s ritual function as an ability to percieve the artwork’s
situatedness. Locating Benjamin within the medical context of my present discussion, we
can thus say that medicine, when based in ritual, can percieve the patient’s assertion of
their authority and authenticity—that is, their situatededness in a particular historical,
cultural, and political context.

Keeping within Benjamin’s context, it is not only the patient but also the one who
perceives the patient who can assert authority. As Benjamin argues when using surgery as
an analogy for cinematography, the magician increases the distance between himself and
the patient “by his authority” (35, italics added). Thus, medicine finds its basis in ritual
when it perceives the patient’s situatedness, but also when it relies upon the practitioner’s
authority. Derkatch explains that evidence-based medicine “emphasizes the low value of
knowledge based solely on authority” and thereby implies that not following its standards
“takes medicine back to the dark ages of authority-based medicine and anecdotal
21

Sara Ahmed understands historicity in a very similar way to van den Akker insofar as historicity involves
not only going back to the past, but also considering possibilities for the future. I take up Ahmed’s notion
of historicity in relation to medicine’s encounters with others in Chapter 2.
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(unsystematic, low quality) evidence” (111-12). While EBM claims to no longer practice
medicine based upon authority, it fails to recognize how it still depends upon the
naturalized authority of a fallaciously objective and neutral evidence base. EBM has not
eliminated the role of authority in modern medical practice and research; rather, the basis
for its authority has simply shifted from magic/spirituality to evidence. While evidence
may seem like a justifiable reason for a medical model (and its practitioners, researchers,
and educators) to hold authority, it is not when this authority is attained through an
uncritical reliance upon an evidence base that is actually ideologically determined. Thus,
while the authority of the hegemonic medical model’s evidence purports to only offer
patients cures, it actually also prescribes ideologies.22

Benjamin further relates the ritualistic basis of art to its cult value in the prehistoric era,
which lies in opposition to the artwork’s exhibition value in the era of technological
reproducibility (25). Whereas an artwork derived its cult value from being kept out of
sight of the masses, its availability to the masses determines its exhibition value.
Similarly, medicine derived its cult value from keeping the patient’s body largely out of
sight; the shaman or medical practitioner could not—and often did not need to—see
inside the patient’s body in order to perform her diagnosis and cure. The age of
technological reproducibility instead exposes everything inside the patient’s body—from
organs to cells and even molecules—to medicine’s gaze. At the same time, while the shift
from cult value to exhibition value destroys the artwork’s aura by severing art’s roots in
ritual, the technological reproducibility that causes this rupture also “emancipates the
work of art from its parasitic subservience to ritual” (Benjamin 24). Similarly,
technological reproducibility emancipates medicine from its subservience to the
practitioner’s authority as well as the patient’s situatedness. Yet this emancipation does
not necessarily liberate the patient from medical authority because, as I have argued,
authority has simply shifted to evidence itself, such that medicine no longer treats the
patient as uniquely situated in a particular historical, cultural, and political context. In
short, in the case of medicine, severing medicine’s subservience to ritual severs the
22

I provide specific examples of how evidence is ideologically determined in section 1.2.3.
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patient’s situatedness, thereby leaving the patient vulnerable to interpolation into a new
context wholly determined by medicine’s politics.23

The emancipation of art from ritual means that the “whole social function of art is
revolutionized. Instead of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice:
politics” (25). For Benjamin, modern art’s social function is political insofar as its
technological reproducibility results in mass engagement with art, thereby allowing
fascism, capitalism, or communism to disseminate their ideologies to the masses. That is
to say, art’s technological reproducibility in-and-of-itself is neutral; how systems and
their ideologies co-opt art via technological reproduction makes art political. Evidencebased biomedicine, under the guise of its supposed objectivity, often fails to recognize
this crucial insight with regards to its own technological reproducibility: like modern art,
modern medicine’s technological reproducibility renders its social function primarily
political. And like modern art, modern medicine is political insofar as its technological
reproducibility results in mass engagement with medicine, thereby allowing medicine to
be co-opted by politics in order to disseminate—or prescribe—ideologies to the masses.
As Benjamin argues, “the technological reproducibility of the artwork changes the
relation of the masses to art” (36, italics original). For example, whereas in a previously
ritualistic era art was largely experienced by individuals, technologically reproducible art
like film is collectively experienced in a theatre such that each individual’s reaction ends
up being organized and regulated by others in the mass. The technological reproducibility
of medicine has also fundamentally changed the relation of the masses to medicine. We
now collectively experience medicine insofar as medical research (and, in turn, practice)
establishes standards for what counts as a “healthy” and “abled” body for mass patient
groups, as well as a standard recovery narrative for the ill mass’s return to “health” and
“ability” through medical intervention. Masses of patients then regulate themselves, or
are regulated, in order to meet medicine’s standards. These standards for “health” and
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In making this argument, I want to make clear that, like Benjamin, I am not claiming nostalgia for a
“better” past when patients and art still had auras. Rather than re-romanticizing some sense of aura, I am
instead deploying aura, particularly via Hansen, to indicate the importance of situatedness for medicine. In
this way, I mean to re-politicize a notion of aura for the medical humanities.
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“ability” are not just based in an “objective” medical evidence base—one that is
supposedly wholly emancipated from its basis in ritual/authority; rather, these standards
are based in ideologies and thereby serve modern medicine’s new social function of
politics. In other words, evidence-based biomedicine interpellates indviduals as
patients.24 The next section will exemplify the political function of modern medicine by
exploring three cases of medicine’s technological reproducibility and their interpellation
of patients: online health websites, pregnancy testing, and assisted reproductive
technologies.

1.2.3

The Political Function of Medicine: Three Case Studies

Feminist artists and scholars are especially cognizant of the political consequences of the
technological reproducibility of the dominant medical model. Artist and scholar Bee
Hughes critically analyzes the menstrual norms reproduced by UK-based online health
websites in her article “Challenging Menstrual Norms in Online Medical Advice:
Deconstructing Stigma through Entangled Art Practice.” Online health websites—from
WebMD to government health services—constitute a major technology of modern
medicine used to reproduce political and normative medical standards under the guise of
“objective” evidence-based health information. Hughes’ analysis reveals that the medical
information presented on these health websites implies a politics that assumes and
thereby reproduces a particular patient as the subject of ideology: a (cis)sexist and
heteronormative standard around who menstruates. Moreover, these websites reproduce
standards of what “normal” menstruation is and should be: a regular 28-day cycle that is
both physically and emotionally painful and lasts for approximately 5 days. Any

In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970), Louis Althusser famously theorizes that
ideological state apparatuses (like the police) exert their power not only through coercion and violence, but
also the more insidious method of interpellation wherein an individual is made to mis-recognize themselves
as a subject within that ideological system. Put another way, systems (like evidence-based biomedicine)
enforce their ideologies by interpellating individuals into subject positions it has created for them (like
patients).
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deviation from this standard is thus impliciltly pathological. As such, these websites
implicitly invite readers to seek further medical technological interventions (most
typically the birth control pill) to “normalize” their menstrual cycles, even if their
“original” cycle posed no health risks. The menstrual standard put forward by these
websites is produced through the evidence-based medical model which establishes its
generalized standard for menstruation from studies of mass populations of menstruators.
The logic of evidence-based medicine here is doubly suspect: there may, in fact, not be a
single individual in the populations studied who ever met the generalized standard in the
first place (that is how averages work after all), and the population studied most likely
excluded trans, intersex, and queer people. Ultimately, these health information websites
technologically reproduce particular political and normative ideas around menstruation in
ways that incite the masses to seek further medical technologies (e.g. the birth control
pill) to actualize such ideas in their bodies.

The technological reproducibility of medicine transforms menstruation into pathology so
it can regulate not only the physiological process of menstruation, but also ideologies of
gender and sexuality. Writer and theorist Paul B. Preciado describes this process
poignantly in his 2008 book Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the
Pharmacopornographic Era: “the success of the contemporary technoscientific industry
consists in transforming our depression into Prozac, our masculinity into testosterone, our
erection into Viagra, our fertility/sterility into the Pill, our AIDS into tritherapy, without
knowing which comes first: our depression or Prozac, Viagra or an erection, testosterone
or masculinity, the Pill or maternity, tritherapy or AIDS” (34-5). For Preciado, as for
Benjamin with regards to art, the technological reproducibility of medicine is not
inherently problematic, but becomes a problem when it is co-opted by oppressive systems
like capitalism or what he dubs the “pharmacopornographic regime.” As such, Preciado
remains hopeful that the pharmaceutical technologies of medicine might still be co-opted
by a different kind of politics: “the fact that the Pill must be managed at home, by the
individual user in an autonomous way, also introduces the possibility of political agency”
(208). An excellent example of this possibility for medical technologies is the pregnancy
test. In his article “The feminist appropriation of pregnancy testing in 1970s Britain,”
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Jesse Olszynko-Gryn reveals that under the control of medical institutions, pregnancy
testing technologies were used—or strategically not used—for particular political ends: to
control abortion, women’s roles as mothers, heterosexual relationships, monogamy,
capitalist economies, and more. For example, in 1940s Britain, married woman in
heterosexual relationships were not offered pregnancy testing because it was assumed
that they should be trying to get pregnant, and so testing these “healthy” women would be
a “waste” of resources under the newly funded, yet already financially overstretched
National Health Service (Olszynko-Gryn 3). In this case, the biomedical model
reproduced a politically-constructed “healthy” subject: one that is deemed to be not only
physically “healthy,” but also socially “healthy” by meeting societal expectations around
gender and sexuality. But when pregnancy testing technology was made accessible to the
masses and could be managed at home, it was politically co-opted by feminist activists
against the medical institution’s own politics by using pregnancy testing for early,
informed abortion decisions, family planning, and more.

The fact that many medical technologies—from pregnancy tests to health advice
websites—now reach patients in their homes parallels how the technological
reproducibility of art “enables the original to meet the recipient halfway” (Benjamin 21).
Benjamin goes on to emphasize that “in permitting the reproduction to reach the
recipient in his or her own situation, [technological reproducibility] actualizes that
which is reproduced” (22, italics original). Similarly, the reproduction of menstrual
norms through health websites prompts patients—who are presumably browsing the web
from home—to go out to a medical clinic, hospital, and/or pharmacy to get a pill that they
can use at home in order to actualize those menstrual norms in their bodies. As such,
however, medicine in the age of its technological reproducibility does not entirely meet
the patient “halfway” in their “own situation”; rather, it still demands that patients leave
their home, the primary site of healthcare prior to the birth of modern scientific medicine.
The technological reproducibility of medicine depends upon material medical institutions
that are fully equipped with x-rays, surgical tools, and more—as well as being centralized
sites (oftentimes connected to universities and/or research centres) where the dominant
medical model can most efficiently be reproduced across research labs and medical
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learners. These medical centres are mostly located in cities and can vary greatly
depending on funding and/or donations from regional institutions and individuals. In this
way, the material conditions that make the technological reproducibility of medicine
possible presume and exacerbate many economic and political conditions. Thus, medical
technologies that “meet” the patient at home still depend upon material economic and
political conditions. Pills, pregnancy tests, and internet access cost money—and even if
one has the financial means to buy a pregnancy test, for example, one may not be able to
do so anonymously in a small, rural town where they are likely to run into someone they
know at the local drug store. Assistive reproductive technologies (ARTs) are especially
problematic in this regard as they are notoriously expensive, rarely available outside
major metropolitan centres, and come with the stigma of infertility. 25

But the material conditions of access are not the only politics to be considered with
regards to ARTs. In “Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a
Biotechnological Age” (2007), Alys Eve Weinbaum also deploys Benjamin’s critical
theory of art as a heuristic to understand medicine, but her analysis is specifically focused
on the ideological effects of race-based biotechnologies, like ARTs. Weinbaum’s central
argument is that, despite science’s claims to having ushered society into a post-racial
eutopia by proving that there is no genetic and hence biological basis to race, geneticsbased medical technologies like ARTs still reproduce race as a biological essence (211).
Weinbam explains how consumers of ARTs use race, without exception, as a primary
criteria in selecting the genetic materials necessary for the biomedical technology and
thus technologically reproduce and reify geneticized ideas of race as biologically
essential (210). As such, ARTs not only reproduce a “‘defect-’ and ‘disability-’ free child
but, as importantly, [. . .] [creates] a child who is identifiable as the same ‘race’ as the
social ‘parents’ to be” (210). In other words: ARTs technologically reproduce ableist and
racist ideologies. As such, Weinbaum argues that “just as notions of hand-madeness,
authority, and uniqueness haunt the mechanically produced object of which Benjamin
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ARTs include, but are not limited to: artificial or intra-uterine insemination, in vitro fertilization, and
embryo transfer—most of which require the purchase of genetic materials.
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wrote, rendering aura spectral, notions of race as a biological, genetic, and scientifically
quantifiable essence haunt the biotechnological practices and products that this essay
describes [like ARTs], rendering race spectral” (217). The political implications of this
spectre of race remain invisible to the masses because ARTs “have become so completely
integrated into Euro-American culture” that they are now, to a large extent, naturalized
and normalized parts of reproductive medicine (210). But what will never feel natural or
normal to the masses is how they are made to perform in a fractured way for the medical
apparatus. And this is where one might crucially find the opportunity to denaturalize and
thereby subvert evidence-based biomedicine’s ideological effects.

1.3

Where and How the Medical Humanities Might

Intervene
1.3.1

Performing for the Apparatus: A Problem of (Ap)perception

To better understand the patient’s performance, we must return to Benjamin’s analysis of
the film actor’s performance. The stage actor performs in front of a “randomly composed
audience,”26 whereas the film actor performs in front of an apparatus that is a
constellation of technologies—most notably the film camera—and a “group of
specialists—executive producer, director, cinematographer, sound recordist, lighting
designer, and so on” (Benjamin 30). When performing for an apparatus, one forgoes their
aura, which often results in “relinquish[ing] their humanity in the face of an apparatus”
(31), as in the case of factory or computer workers. For Benjamin, the notable exception
to this is film, wherein a successful or accomplished performance by a film actor can still
“preserve one’s humanity in the face of the apparatus” (30-31). Moreover, “interest in the
[film actor’s] performance is widespread” as the working masses go to the cinema to
I could problematize Benjamin’s assertion that a theatre audience is “randomly composed.” A variety of
factors, like socioeconomic class, already pre-determine who will be in a theatre audience. But my
argument does not depend on whether a theatre audience is truly “randomly” composed; rather, what
matters is that a stage actor’s audience differs from a film actor’s.
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“witness the film actor taking revenge on their behalf” by asserting his humanity in the
face of the apparatus (31). In the case of medicince, however, I would argue that “interest
in this performance” is different and even more widespread than Benjamin recognizes
because the masses not only relinquish their humanity through work, but also through
illness in the face of the medical apparatus. Both patients and workers perform in an
arena governed almost exclusively by a constellation of technologies that includes, but is
not limited to, stethoscopes, CT scanners, scalpels, surgical lights, randomized control
trials, and even the medical chart, which is increasingly digitally recorded.27 And this
complex system of technologies used by evidence-based biomedicine to prevent,
diagnose, cure, and manage diseases is endlessly reproducible across patients. Moreover,
the patient also performs for the group of specialists who use these technologies and who,
like the situation of the film actor, “are in a position to intervene in his performance at
any time” (30).28

This intervention dictates that the film actor and patient are compelled to re-assert their
humanity in different ways. Benjamin describes how “for the first time—and this is the
effect of film—the human being is placed in a position where he must operate with his
whole living person, while forgoing its aura” (31). Yet despite the film actor being able to
re-assert his humanity because of this constraint, the patient, like the worker, cannot. For

Benjamin famously proposes that ideas are like constellations in the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” of The
Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928). In a Dictionary of Critical Theory (2010), Ian Buchanan explains
that Benjamin means “ideas are no more present in the world than constellations actually exist in the
heavens, but like constellations they enable us to perceive relations between objects” (n.p.). This doesn’t
mean that ideas are entirely subjective or just in one’s head; there is, after all, something in how the stars
are objectively positioned motivated humans to construct images out of them. The names for the
constellations were also motivated by history, tradition and myth. But Buchanan makes sure to emphasize
that Benjamin’s theorization of ideas as constellations does not mean that ideas (and philosophy) are
systematic, like math or science; rather, they are discursive (n.p.). Drawing upon Benjamin’s understanding
of ideas as constellations, I understand the evidence-based biomedical apparatus to be a constellation in
three key ways. First, it is both objectively and subjectively constructed insofar as is composed of both
material medical technologies and the people (generally clinicians) who use them. Second, the medical
apparatus comes out of a particular history and tradition insofar as the medical technologies and how they
are used come out of a particular Western biomedical tradition of scientific progress. Last, the medical
apparatus is discursive insofar as it constitutes medicine’s knowledge of the patients and disease more
broadly.
28
On average, for instance, physicians interrupt their patients within seven seconds of the patient speaking
(Derkatch 111).
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Benjamin the film actor’s “performance is by no means a unified whole, but is assembled
from many individual performances” (32), which allows the film actor to re-assemble her
identity. The patient’s “performance is by no means a unified whole” either, but her
performance remains fractured by the medical apparatus. First, a patient is often under
the care of many different health professionals (e.g. a nurse and a physician at the very
least) who rarely have the chance to communicate about their shared patient. Moreover,
biomedicine fractures the patient’s body into parts (e.g. organs, cells, and biomolecules)
and evidence-based clinical guidelines fracture care according to disparate diagnostic and
treatment categories for every disease, despite increasing numbers of patients suffering
from multiple interrelated diseases at once. Finally, evidence-based biomedicine treats
the patient’s diseased body as fractured from the patient’s experience of illness and life as
a whole.

This is perhaps one cause of the proliferation of illness narratives since the birth of
modern medicine: such narratives, like the pieces of a performance brought together in a
completed film, allow patients to re-assemble whole selves fractured by the medical
apparatus. In doing so, they ultimately seek to re-assert their humanity in the face of the
evidence-based biomedical model, although illness narratives do not necessarily change
the hegemonic medical model’s fundamental problem of perception. In section 1.2.1, I
argued that the fundamental problem with the evidence-based biomedical model is one of
perception—of how medical practitioners, researchers, and educators perceive unique
patients as apolitical statistical averages and reduced parts. This problem of perception is
inextricably tied to evidence-based biomedicine’s lack of apperception, or conscious
perception29: medical practitioners, researchers, and educators are not aware of nor
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I understand the difference between perception and apperception through Gottfried Leibniz, who states in
Principles of Nature and of Grace (1714) that apperception “is consciousness, or the reflective knowledge”
of that which is perceieved (208 qtd. in Jorgenson n.p., italics original). Leibniz later elaborates on this
difference in New Essays on Human Understanding (1765), wherein he explains that he “prefer[s] to
distinguish between perception and being aware [apperception]. For instance, a perception of light or
colour of which we are aware is made up of many minute perceptions of which we are unaware; and a
noise which we perceive but do not attend to is brought within reach of our awareness by a tiny increase or
addition” (134 qtd. in Jorgenson n.p., italics original). In the context of my discussion, I am concerned with
not only the apperception of things in the world, but also their political and historical contexts.
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reflective about how they perceive patients as apolitical statistical averages. Benjamin
argues that “the function of film is to train human beings in the apperceptions and
reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding
almost daily” (26). As the medical apparatus continues to expand its role in patients’ lives
daily, I am thus incited to ask: can Benjamin’s theory of film inspire new ways to train
medical practitioners, educators, and researchers in the apperceptions needed to deal with
the vast medical apparatus in such a way that preserves the patient’s—and even the
practitioner’s—humanity in the face of the medical apparatus?

One answer to my questions may be found in Benjamin’s discussion of Luigi Pirandello’s
understanding of estrangement30:

The representation of human beings by means of an apparatus has made possible
a highly productive use of the human being’s self-alienation. The nature of this
can be grasped through the fact that the film actor’s estrangement in the face of
the apparatus, as Pirandello describes this experience, is basically of the same
kind as the estrangement felt before one’s appearance in a mirror. (32-33, italics
original).

Benjamin argues that it is, rather unexpectedly, through the experience of estrangement in
front of the apparatus that the film actor is able to preserve his humanity. Similarly,
perhaps estrangement can preserve a patient’s humanity in the face of the medical
apparatus. This is precisely the inspiration for one of the most cited and compelling
medical humanities interventions. Physician Arno Kumagai and literary scholar Delese
Wear argue that art should be used in medical education to “‘make strange’—that is, to
trouble one’s assumptions, perspectives, and ways of being in order to view anew the
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Luigi Pirandello is best known as a dramatist who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1934. Here,
Benjamin is referring to his novel Si gira ... (1915) which was later published under the title Quaderni di
Serafino Gubbio operatore (1925). The novel tells the story of an Italian film camera operator and is one of
the first novels to reflect on filmmaking in modern Europe.
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self, others, and the world” (973). Kumagai and Wear’s intervention is particularly
compelling because it tackles modern medicine’s fundamental lack of apperception,
particularly where, recalling Benjamin’s theory of art, it seeks to close distance and
overcome each thing’s uniqueness. Kumagai and Wear begin with Vicktor Shklovsky’s
theory of familiarization, which posits that perceptions become habituated such that we
end up perceiving most of the world unconsciously. For Shklovsky, literature—and art
more generally—can defamiliarize the world through the process of estrangement.31
Taking Shklovsky’s theory in an economic and political direction, and echoing
Pirandello’s notion of estrangement, dramatist Berthold Brecht (one of Benjamin’s most
well-known interlocutors) argues that the habituated and deeply entrenched perceptions
of structures such as capitalism naturalize and thus blind us to the oppressive nature of
the world as it really is in our everyday lives. Inspired largely by Marx, Brecht developed
a critical theatre that sought to alienate or distance the audience from the performance so
they could recognize the injustices at play not merely in the performance, but in their own
lives as well.32

It is from here that Kumagai and Wear argue how “making strange” can play a critical
role for the arts and humanities in medical education, particularly by training a new
generation of physicians in a practice that estranges and defamiliarizes and thus
repeatedly critiques assumptions of and about the medical gaze. Hansen teases apart
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In Theory of Prose (1929), Schklovsky, a Russian literary critic and theorist, develops his theory of
ostranenie. The term can be translated as defamiliarization or estrangement and is a neologism for both
“making strange” and “pushing aside.” It refers to the techniques writers use to transform ordinary
language into poetic language, forces readers outside their typical habits of perception by making the
familiar appear strange (Buchanan n.p.).
Brecht was best known for his highly political, Marxist-inspired “epic theatre” which sought to inspire
political debate by “constantly reminding the audience that what they are seeing is both artificial and
contrived and something that should be evaluated and judged” (Buchanan n.p.). Brecht coined the term
“estrangement-effect” (sometimes translated as alienation-effect) to describe “the moment in a work of art
[especially in epic theatre] when that which used to appear natural suddenly appears historical” (Buchanan
n.p.). That effect is inherenty political in the same way my critique of evidence-based biomedicine is: it
challenges one to see the structures (like evidence-based biomedicine, in this chapter’s case and capitalism,
in Brecht’s case) that normalize and naturalize how things have supposedly always been, and hence allows
one to recognize that those structures can and indeed should be changed.
32
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Benjamin’s “later definition of aura as the experience of investing a phenomenon with
the ability to return the gaze,” which “attributes the agency of the auratic gaze to the
object being looked at, thereby echoing philosophical speculation from early romanticism
through Henri Bergson that the ability to return the gaze is already dormant in, if not
constitutive of, the object” (343). Hansen characterizes this auratic return of the gaze as
an “unsettling force” insofar as it

exceeds and destabilizes traditional scientific, practical, and representational
conceptions of vision, along with linear notions of time and space and clearcut, hierarchical distinctions between subject and object. In this mode of
vision, the gaze of the object, however familiar, is experienced by the subject
as other and prior, strange and heteronomous. Whether conceptualized in
terms of a constitutive lack, split, or loss, this other gaze in turn confronts the
subject with a fundamental strangeness within and of the self. (345)

Yet as I suggest above, we must also be careful not to equate the complexly and often
arduous estranging and defamiliarizing work of apperception with an immediate
liberatory politics, especially the kind supposedly offered by capitalism. I thus want to
end this chapter by outlining two traps embedded within capitalism’s troubled and
compromising relationship with medicine, particularly as it is symptomatic of the kinds
of otherwise beneficial solutions offered by the medical humanities.

1.3.2

Capitalism’s First Trap: The Wellness Industry

Benjamin makes sure to emphasize that “there can be no political advantage derived from
this control [by the masses] until film has liberated itself from the fetters of capitalist
exploitation” (33). The same is true of medicine, wherein “wellness” has become a new
model of healthcare that is supposedly liberated from the control of medical
professionals, but plays into the hands of capitalism. The wellness model purports to give
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control of healthcare back to the masses by meeting their demands for more holistic
healthcare that attends to the whole, unique individual; however, the entire model is
driven by a highly capitalist wellness industry that serves the financial interests of an elite
minority—not the health of the masses. The wellness industry, much like the film
industry, performs for an invisible mass that controls it. That is: the masses are
demanding a new medical model that attends to whole, unique individuals—precisely
that which is assimilated by the evidence-based biomedical model—and the wellness
industry offers this back to the masses by selling them yoga, a plethora of alternative
medical practices, green smoothies, personalized supplement regimes, individualized
allergy tests, and more. The masses’ demand for a new medical model that attends to
whole, unique individuals is important, and I do not want to dismiss that. But the
wellness industry does not actually confer any advantage over the hegemonic medical
model because it is still tied to capitalist exploitation.

Benjamin goes so far as to compare the capitalist film industry to fascism, arguing that
“the same is true of film capital in particular as of fascism in general: a compelling urge
towards new social opportunities is being clandestinely exploited in the interests of a
property-owning minority” (34). This comparison reveals the fascist logic behind the
wellness industry as well: wellness offers a compelling urge towards new social
opportunities (e.g. for self-care, alternative medicine, the patient’s voice, etc.) that are
clandestinely exploited in the interests of a bourgeois minority (e.g. mostly rich, white,
heterosexual cis-women like Gwenyth Paltrow). Benjamin further theorizes that “fascism
seeks to give [the masses] expression in keeping [property] relations unchanged. The
logical outcome of fascism is an aestheticizing of political life” (41, italics original). In a
parallel way, the wellness industry seeks to give expression to the masses by superficially
meeting their demands for a new medical model, all the while keeping capitalist relations
unchanged and aestheticizing the political life of attaining health or “wellness” as
overwhelmingly clean, white, and sleek. The wellness aesthetic is typified by
photographs of green “super food” smoothies on sparkling marble countertops, white
women doing yoga on pristine white beaches, meditation retreats in contemporary log
cabins, and so forth. This aestheticizing dangerously renders health and illness as
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apolitical. This is especially true with respect to self-care—a practice that was first
developed by black, queer feminists like Audre Lorde as a form of activism in the face of
oppression,33 but is now aestheticized by the wellness industry as a supposed cure-all that
is, in fact, often only accessible to the rich. Wellness aestheticizes the politics of illness
such that the burden of attaining health (“wellness”) is placed solely on the shoulders of
individuals: if you just eat “clean” enough, exercise enough, meditate enough, and visit
your naturopath enough, then you will achieve peak wellness, so the industry story goes.
In this way, the wellness industry dangerously elides how illness and health are deeply
political: illnesses disproportionally affects people who are politically marginalized, and
this problem is doubled as these are very people have the most limited access to
healthcare under both the evidence-based biomedical model and the wellness industry.34

By taking various medical issues out of the direct hands of medical authority, the
wellness industry apparently “democratizes” self-care and hence empowers patients, but
it really just transform patients into customers. This supposedly alternative model and
remedy to evidence-based biomedicine still relies upon technological reproducibility for
oppressive ideological ends, but through the technologies of social media, vaginal jade

In the epilogue to “A Burst of Light: Living with Cancer” in A Burst of Light: Essays (1988), Lorde
famously states that “caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of
political warfare” (131). For Lorde, self-care is an act of “political warfare” insofar as it sustains her energy
for political activisim in the face of the intersectional oppression she faces as a Black, queer, ill woman. In
The Cancer Journals (1980), Lorde consistently ties her experience of breast cancer back to political
concerns, like her experience with the essentialist and coersive expectation for post-mastectomy cancer
survivors (like herself) to desire breasts, as well as the obscured environmental causes of breast cancer due
to capitalist corporations that pollute the environment. Thus, for Lorde, caring for herself through cancer is
inextricably tied to caring about challenging the politics that shape her illness experience.
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Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) especially exemplifies this point. COPD is an umbrella
term for many progressive lung diseases that are characterized by increasing breathlessness (e.g.
emphysema and non-reversible asthma) and it is one of the leading global causes of death and disability.
COPD disproportionately affects people in low- and middle-income countries where the air is more
polluted because global political power has concentrated mines and factories in these countries. Moreover,
most families in these countries live in poverty and thus use biomass and coal for energy in their homes,
which further pollutes the air. And because the people who are most affected by COPD are already so
politically marginalized, COPD receives disproportionately low levels of attention and funding for research
and treatment compared to other major global causes of death and disability, like cancer. Death and
disability from COPD is predicted to grow as political inequity and environmental pollution do too. See
Quaderi and Hurst 2018 for a succinct summary of the disproportionate global burden of COPD.
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eggs, faux allergy tests, and the like. This approach to illness has a long history. Derkatch
explains that medical

quacks [of the eighteenth century] were not anti-establishment: they did not
subscribe to their own philosophical or therapeutic systems but rather sought to
capitalize on the public’s newfound thirst for medical goods. They traded on the
esteem of the emerging medical profession by mimicking its modes of practice
and its esoteric, technical language to attract customers in a market of competing
healers. (25)

The wellness industry also functions through mimicry. A quick browse through the
website for Gwenyth Paltrow’s company Goop—the epitome of the wellness industry—
reveals the same appeal to technical language, practitioner credentials, and “evidence”
that the dominant medical model also relies upon.35 But instead of selling you
pharmaceutical drugs, Goop—and the wellness industry in general—will sell you “sex
dust” and unnecessary supplements. Moreover, the wellness industry does not simply
mimic evidence-based biomedicine, it also mimics complementary and alternative
medicines (CAM) in fetishistic ways. The wellness industry quite literally cashes in on
appropriating, white-washing, and then selling CAM (often dubbed as alternative
“modalities” by Goop) to its predominantly white and upper-class market. In this way,
the wellness industry also assimilates difference across medical practices—not just
patients. CAM practices—not the whitewashed versions—do indeed offer a supplement
to evidence-based biomedicine and, in doing so, reveal flaws in the hegemonic model’s
logic. Derkatch explains how “in contrast to biomedicine, [CAM] practices view patients
as fundamentally unique, so two people with the same ailment might be treated altogether
differently, depending on their unique constellation of symptoms and personal
characteristics” (39). This is precisely the kind of intervention that is most difficult for

35

Goop began in 2008 as a weekly e-newsletter and incorporated in 2011. Goop now has website that
offers wellness advice and sells an extensive array of wellness products, hosts events and pop-up shops,
and produces a podcast series, print magazine, and documentary series.
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randomized control trials to study and statistical analyses to standardize. As such, CAM
cannot be properly accounted for as part of the evidence base of the dominant medical
model and as such reveals where the model’s “gold standard” of evidence falls short.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Derkatch uses the term “constellations” to
describe the patient’s symptoms and personal characteristics. Though evidence-based
biomedicine tries to render patient symptoms and personal characteristics as objective
data that can be scientifically and statistically analysed, it is more apt to understand
patient symptoms and personal characteristics as constellations in the Benjaminian
sense—that is, as simultaneously objective and subjective phenomena that come out of
particular histories, traditions, and myths. For example, pain (a symptom) and race (a
personal characteristic) are often reduced to supposedly “objective” facts by medicine
(e.g. a numeric scale for pain or genetics/ancestry for race). Even how medicine perceives
a patient’s pain and/or race is largely subjectively determined. And the subjective
determination of pain and race is influenced by histories, traditions, and myths—for
instance, those of Black slaves not being fully human and its influence on one’s
subjective perception of a Black patient’s pain. Or the history of the “one drop rule” and
its influence on one’s subjective perception of who does and does not count as Black.
Such examples demonstrate evidence-based biomedicine’s lack of apperception is thus an
inability to recognize how it perceives patient symptoms and personal characteristics in
this subjective, historically determined way. Understanding patient symptoms and
personal characteristics as constellations also allows one to recognize that they cannot be
understand systematically (even though evidence-based biomedicine continuously tries),
but rather must be understood discursively. Evidence-based biomedicine thus must not
only recognize its problem with (ap)perception, but also its problem with discourse.

Derkatch quotes rhetorician Charles Anderson to elaborate on how evidence-based
biomedicine has a problem with both (ap)perception and discourse:
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although the patient is ‘the centre of the medical event,’ he or she, as a person,
tends to be taken as ‘merely attached to the machine delivered up for repair.’
Compounding this limited view of the patient as a machine is a limited view in
contemporary biomedicine of the patient as an interlocutor. Clinical encounters
can frequently be rhetorically disabling for patients because they occur within
well-established hierarchies under circumstances generally beyond the patient’s
control. In such a dynamic, anthropologist Christine Barry and colleagues explain,
‘The voice of medicine has doctors maintaining control within a power
imbalance. As a result the coherent and meaningful accounts of patients are
suppressed,’ resulting in ‘disruption and fragmentation of communication.’ (111)

Whereas Derkatch identifies the hegemonic medical model’s problem of perception as a
“limited view of the patient as a machine,” I would add that this “limited view” is, more
specifically, a limited (ap)perception of the patient as merely part of a medical apparatus
that includes all the medical technologies that obscure or substitute for the patient, like
statistics. Derkatch also identifies a limited view of the patient as an interlocutor, which is
where evidence-based biomedicine’s problem of (ap)perception slips into a problem of
discourse as the doctor controls what can or cannot be said in the clinical encounter. As
the doctor (and modern medicine as a whole) “supresses” the patient’s “coherent and
meaningful accounts,” the patient is discursively fragmented, further denying their
humanity. Derkatch concludes that “patient-centred care is predicated on the idea that we
need to offset the technoscientific, doctor-oriented discourse that pervades much of
medicine today, to restore the whole patient, as an individual agent, to the medical
encounter” (112). Derkatch’s analysis reminds us that the technological reproducibility of
the evidence-based biomedical model is a matter of discourse as well as a lack of (ap)
perception, which are in many ways co-constituted: what we perceive is often influenced
by the language we use to describe what we perceive, and our discourses reflect how we
perceive the world.
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1.3.3

Capitalism’s Second Trap: Narrative Regulation

The medical humanities are also invested in “offsetting” evidence-based biomedicine’s
limited “technoscientific, doctor-oriented” discourse of disease, especially through illness
narratives that centre the patient’s perspective and widen the discourse around illness.
But the power of illness narratives are too often taken for granted in the medical
humanities (i.e. that illness narratives can change the discourse around illness and thereby
change the way patients are perceived and treated by evidence-based biomedicine). Just
as a CAM and patient-centred care risk being co-opted by capitalism through the
wellness industry, illness narratives also risk being co-opted by capitalism. The evidencebased biomedical model is often characterized as “cookbook medicine” by its critics,
especially practitioners of other medical models like CAM and the medical humanities.
Solomon explains how the implied criticism of “cookbook medicine” is that “the medical
practice is ‘one size fits all’ rather than nuanced to individual cases and also (to my ear)
that those who practice ‘cookbook medicine’ are not really thinking about it or taking its
human implications seriously” (185). I broadly concur with Solomon’s observation, but
want more specifically to argue that the “cookbook” approach of evidence-based
biomedicine doesn’t take its political implications seriously. Many books like James
Meza and Daniel Passerman’s Integrating Narrative Medicine and Evidence-based
Medicine (2011) suggest “that evidence-based medicine provides the general background
knowledge and narrative medicine does the work of tailoring this knowledge to particular
cases” (Solomon 196). But Solomon is rightly critical of such a tidy and simple bridge
being drawn between evidence-based medicine and narrative medicine. Such simplistic
accounts too often fall back on reductive understandings of narrative, such as the
pervasive assumption in the medical humanities that narratives are singular and thus can
provide insight into singular (unique) patients. Solomon contends that “narrative
medicine promises to treat each patient ‘as an individual,’ with attention to their unique
identity. This is a heady promise, especially in […] liberal democracies, which value
uniqueness and individuality. But narratives are not completely singular” (197). I concur
with Solomon that narratives are not singular, and especially not illness narratives which
tend to follow similar plot structures (often towards recovery) and deploy similar tropes

43

44

(e.g. the common military metaphors for “fighting” illness). Solomon identifies that
promises to treat patients as individuals through attention to narrative are wrapped up in
relevant political contexts, but her caution ends there without further grappling with the
consequences of such politics.

This is where Solomon turns to critical theory through Judy Segal, a rhetorician and
theorist of health. Here is how Solomon summarizes Segal’s essay on breast cancer
narratives:

Segal argues the ubiquity of similar breast cancer stories and the negative
reactions to stories that depart from the norm are evidence of ‘narrative
regulation’ that suppresses other kinds of narrative [...] The standard story may be
an improvement on older narratives of physician authority and patient passivity.
However, as a recognized narrative type, it has come to play a normative role in
discouraging other narratives, such as those that focus on the environmental
causes of breast cancer and what the community can do to address them. It also
discourages narratives that describe personal struggle and do not end in personal
victory. And it discourages narratives that talk about prevention rather than about
detection and cure. (199)

Segal traces the role technologies have played in this regulation of breast cancer
narratives, especially illness blogs and patient websites. She describes how most blog and
site users feed off each other’s similar stories and many moderators even go as far as to
censor stories that don’t fit the repeated “survivor” or “fighter” individual recovery
narrative (5-6). So in Benjamin’s words, the technological reproducibility of illness
narratives online assimilates difference into the same standard breast cancer narrative.
This narrative regulation of breast cancer echoes Benjamin’s discussion of the masses
regulating their reactions to films by virtue of experiencing the art form together in the
movie theatre. If even just a few people in the cinema start laughing, the rest inevitably
do too. Segal’s analysis reveals how a similar kind of regulation now also happens online

44

45

as masses of patients regulate their reactions to—and hence narratives of—breast cancer
by virtue of experiencing the illness together in the virtual theatre of the internet.

Segal thus argues that the standard breast cancer narrative is at the very least repetitive
and prescriptive, and at its very worst “coopted – by business and industry in general, and
by pharmaceutical companies in particular, who advertise anti-cancer drugs directly to
consumers, using the very terms of the standard story itself” (6). The technological
reproduction of breast cancer narratives online does not simply assimilate the difference
of unique narratives into the same standard story, but also dangerously leaves that
standard story open for cooption by capitalism. Segal argues that capitalist corporations
have now successfully made breast cancer related marketing and philanthropy a
naturalized subplot of a standard breast cancer narrative, which ends up “pink-washing”
the illness: this “foregrounds a certain kind of femininity, sponsoring docility; it
highlights appearance and activity, and keeps attention from being focused elsewhere: on
activism” (11). Here we get back to the fascist characteristics of the film and wellness
industries: the political life of breast cancer is dangerously aestheticized pink through
capitalism’s cooption of the standard breast cancer narrative. Or to put it more
poignantly: the politics of breast cancer are anaestheticized such that consumers do not
feel the politically-motivated anger they ought to feel towards the companies that are
selling them a pink-washed docility—the very companies that are so often responsible for
the environmental crises and economic inequities that cause so much of the suffering
from breast cancer in the first place. Illness narratives are thus not necessarily a remedy
to evidence-based biomedicine’s problems as capitalism can coopt them too.

1.4

Conclusion

I do not mean to paint such a bleak, hopeless picture of the dominant medical system. I
have genuine hopes for the possibility to get beyond the grasp of evidence-based
biomedicine’s assimilative sameness and capitalism’s cooption—especially through the
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medical humanities. But this is not going to happen if we remain ignorant of how the
hegemonic medical model’s technological reproducibility may simply consume our
efforts, especially illness narratives, and use them for its own oppressive political ends. In
the next chapter, I will move from interrogating the evidence-based biomedical model’s
politics to interrogating the politics of a model for ethical clinical encounters—
specifically, the apolitical ethical model proposed by medical humanities scholars
through Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy. I will argue that the medical humanities’
Levinasian model for an ethical clinical encounter, like the evidence-based biomedical
model, fails to account for unique, situated patients.
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2

Medicine’s Strange Encounters with Patients and Texts
2.1

Introduction: Levinas in the Medical Humanities

In the 2016 literature and bioethics special issue of Literature and Medicine, Olivia
Banner identifies a significant problem in the way medical humanities scholars treat race
in literature: not only is race often overlooked by the field, but when it is treated, race is
reduced to an interpersonal concern rather than structural problem. Inspired by Banner, I
contend that a similar problem can be traced in the way humanities scholars have used
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy for medicine. Since the turn of the twenty-first century,
Levinas’ phenomenology of the Other has been increasingly used to theorize an ethical
clinical encounter.36 My contention is that such scholarship abstracts ethics from politics
and thereby is unable to account for a truly ethical clinical encounter that tackles social
injustices, such as racism in medical institutions.37 Banner identifies the problem of race
in the medical humanities by critically tracing “the historical neglect of AfricanAmerican literature in seminal scholarship in the field, and how that literature, when it
does appear, is framed and interpreted” (28). In a similar way, I critically trace how
Levinas’ phenomenology of the Other has been used in the medical humanities to
propose an ethical clinical encounter that ultimately reproduces both patients and
literature as medicine’s fetishized Others—that is, as Others encountered at an
interpersonal level that neglects how structural problems, such as racism, shape such

Humanities scholars have taken up an immense variety of Levinas’ writing and interviews to theorize a
more ethical clinical encounter (see Tauber 1999, Komesaroff 2001, Clifton-Soderstrom 2003, Nortvedt
2003, Frank 2004, Irvine 2005, Burns 2017), but the key texts in which Levinas famously develops his
phenomenology of the Other are Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961) and Otherwise than
Being, or Beyond Essense (1974). Each scholar takes up either or both of these works. I, however, do not
take up Levinas directly myself because I am concerned with analyzing how his work has been taken up by
the medical humanities and how it can be taken up differently through Sara Ahmed’s reading/critique of
Levinas.
36

37

This use of Levinas in the medical humanities reflects increased interest in Levinas in the 1990s by
literary critics such as Derek Attridge and Robert Eagleston. Their mobilization of Levinas produced an
abstractly ethical mode of literary criticism that neglected political particularity. This evacuation of politics
from ethics through Levinas is precisely the same problem that emerges a mere decade later in the medical
humanities.
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encounters.38 As such, the ways in which the medical humanities have mobilized
Levinasian phenomenology thus far fails to adequately account for illness as an
experience that intersects with structural issues such as racism and sexism.

Banner argues that the neglect of race in medical humanities scholarship is especially
problematic when the field purports to foster empathy and listening in clinicians: “those
skills, whatever their value, can do little to overcome the racist practices and biases
embedded in medicine, which are institutionally reproduced, not intrinsic to interpersonal
relations” (27). While I agree with Banner that racism is institutionally reproduced, one
must not forget how such institutional problems are implicated at the level of
interpersonal relations. Whereas Banner argues that the medical humanities must shift its
attention from the interpersonal to the institutional, I argue that the field must deconstruct
such binaries between the interpersonal and the institutional (or the particular and the
general) in the first place. I thus will turn to Sara Ahmed’s phenomenology in Strange
Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (2000) as a heuristic for an ethicalpolitical mode of analysis that brings particularity back into Levinas’ phenomenology
without risking essentialism, implicates the institutional in the interpersonal, and widens
the application of Levinasian ethics to literature as well as patients.

Alfred I. Tauber’s Confessions of a Medicine Man: An Essay in Popular Philosophy
(2000) is one of the earliest and most seminal books to explicitly make a case for the
value of philosophizing about the doctor-patient relationship. Tauber is also the first
scholar to take up Levinas for medicine and dedicates an entire chapter to this project.
Yet Tauber’s book entirely erases the contribution of women to philosophy (it is titled
Confessions of a Medicine Man, after all). While reflecting on his frustrations at having
to constantly justify the value of philosophy to medical school, Tauber half-jokingly
asserts: “I have often fantasized of handing out tee-shirts to our entering medical
students: In bright colours on the front I would have emblazoned the slogan, ‘Medicine
I capitalize the term “other” when I am mirroring another author’s use of capitalization and/or I am
referring to a fetishized, abstracted Other as a philosophical category.
38
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must become philosophical,’ with an imprint of Locke or Hume or Kant or Nietzsche on
the back” (92). Tauber—like the very philosophers he cites—takes for granted the
fallacious neutrality and generalizability of the white, male, Euro-American philosophical
canon. By taking for granted the philosophical canon upon which he draws in order to
make the doctor-patient relationship more ethical, Tauber reifies the very hierarchies—
masculine/feminine, white/colour, mind/body, etc.—that render his claim to ethics
untenable in the first place. This apolitical and neutral approach to Levinasian ethics
continues to plague the medical humanities.

Michelle Clifton-Soderstrom’s “Levinas and the Patient as Other: The Ethical Foundation
of Medicine” (2003) is a key example of the ways in which the medical humanities have
mobilized Levinas to theorize an ethical physicial-patient encounter. Asserting that
“medical practice is first and foremost an ethic” rather than a science (448), CliftonSoderstrom explicitly mirrors Levinas’ philosophical project of situating ethics as prior
to—rather than a derivative of—ontology and epistemology. This move is a radical
challenge to medicine for two reasons. First, shifting medicine’s foundation to ethics in
the Levinasian sense means considering medicine’s foundation as prior to knowledge,
thereby significantly challenging medicine’s knowledge seeking and producing
enterprise. Second, using Levinas to shift medicine from science to ethics is a specifically
phenomenological move, one which grounds medicine in questions of (inter)subjectivity
and experience, thereby allowing Clifton-Soderstrom to subvert medicine’s claims to
objectivity and universality. This reconsideration of medicine as a fundamentally ethical
discipline is ubiquitous across all the essays that have taken up Levinas for medicine thus
far—and for good reason. My contention lies not with privileging ethics as the foundation
of medicine, but with the current shape Levinasian ethics take in medicine.

Clifton-Soderstrom argues that medicine should strive for the kind of ethical encounter
entailed by Levinas’ phenomenological description of simultaneously being called to
responsibility by the face of the other (coming into proximity) and respecting the radical
alterity of the other (maintaining distance). This phenomenological manoeuvre of
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maintaining both proximity and distance between physician and patient is also largely
consistent across all the papers that take up Levinas for medicine. As Clifton-Soderstrom
describes it: the patient as the other “calls to me [the clinician] first in her transcendence,
and I am ethically obliged to serve her. This moral obligation that arises from the other is
grounded in the face-to-face encounter, which is essential to medical practice” (455). The
other’s ability to so powerfully call upon the physician’s moral obligation is dependent
upon a face-to-face encounter with the other’s radical alterity: “the face, in essence,
transcends culture and history and all that is dependent on them” and the moral moment
for medicine lies in this transcendent capacity of the other’s face (454). My critique (via
Ahmed’s critique of Levinas) will take on this peculiar abstraction and essentializing of
the other, the dangerous slip from ethics to morality, and the fallacious idealization of a
transcendence of difference.

Clifton-Soderstrom ultimately argues for narrative discourse as a way to achieve a
Levinasian ethics in medicine. She draws largely upon the seminal work of medical
sociologist Arthur Frank in order to conclude that “narrative allows the Other to be
herself” (459). In other words: narrative allows one to simultaneously bring the Other
close and yet maintain the Other’s alterity. While I believe that Clifton-Soderstrom’s
work is an important starting point for discussions about the value of philosophy and
narrative in medicine, it is not nearly rigorous or nuanced enough today. Two years after
Clifton-Soderstrom’s article, Galen Strawson published his landmark essay “Against
Narrativity” (2004) wherein he argues against normative claims (like those by Frank and
Clifton-Soderstrom) that living a life through narrative or listening to others’ narratives is
necessarily good—and that all humans live their life narratively in the first place.
Strawson’s essay has had significant reverberations in the so-called “narrative turn”
across numerous disciplines, including the medical humanities. In “Beyond the Wounded
Storyteller: Rethinking Narrativity, Illness and Embodied Self-Experience” (2013),
Angela Woods takes up Strawson’s argument to challenge the medical humanities’
uncritical elevation of narrative through a close critical reading of Frank’s The Wounded
Storyteller (1995). Thus, in the intervening years since Clifton-Soderstrom’s initial
publication, I am compelled to consider how a feminist phenomenological framework can
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address such problems by providing medicine a more critical and ethical way to engage
with texts (narrative and otherwise).

2.2
2.2.1

Bringing Sara Ahmed Into the Medical Humanities
Ahmed’s Critique of Levinas

The crux of Ahmed’s critique of Levinas reveals a fundamental contradiction in his
phenomenology39:

To describe ‘the other’ as having the character of ‘otherness’ is to recognize the
other in a certain way: the other is abstracted from particular others (the ‘the’
turning the other into an article of speech). Through that abstraction, the other
becomes a fetish: it is assumed to contain otherness within the singularity of its
form (‘entire being’). Such a cutting off of ‘the other’ from the modes of
encounter in which one meets an-other allows ‘the other’ to appear in
Levinas’s texts as an alien being, whom one might then encounter, in the
entirety of that very form. (143)

As Ahmed argues, Levinas’ phenomenology rather paradoxically thematizes the other as
other while concealing that thematization by defining the other as beyond thematization.
In this way, Levinas’ phenomenology ultimately describes the other as an alien/strange
being despite asserting that the other comes before ontology and epistemology. Ahmed’s
critique even plays out at the level of grammar: where Levinas writes of encountering the
other, Ahmed writes of encountering others or an other. For Ahmed, it is precisely
In Strange Encounters, Ahmed understands, builds upon, and critiques Levinas’ philosophical project by
engaging with the following works: Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1979) translated by
Alfonso Lingis, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Wemoi (1985) translated by R.A. Cohen,
Time and the Other: And Additional Essays (1987), translated by R.A. Cohen, and Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence (1991) translated by Alfonso Lingis.
39
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Levinas’ abstraction of the other (claiming to not know the other in any particular way)
that ultimately represents the other as precisely someone who possesses alterity as an
essential trait. Whereas Levinas may seek phenomenologically to describe an encounter
with the other that is prior to knowledge, Ahmed argues that his figure of the other is
already constructed as a fetishized stranger through knowledge: “The stranger is someone
we know as not knowing, rather than some-body we simply do not know. The stranger is
produced as a category within knowledge, rather than coming into being in an absence of
knowledge” (55).

The concept of stranger fetishism is central to Ahmed’s critique: “it invests the figure of
the stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts ‘the stranger’ off from the histories of
its determination.” Ahmed draws largely upon Marx to develop her argument about
stranger fetishism: fetishization involves the displacement of social relations through the
transformation of objects or subjects into figures, which thereby cuts those figures off
from their social and material relations (5). The stranger as a fetishized figure in the
philosophies of thinkers like Levinas risks homogenizing and universalizing the stranger,
thereby erasing important forms of difference—how and why some bodies are designated
as stranger than others (5-6). Without taking such forms of difference into account,
ethics cannot adequately account for concerns such as racism, sexism, or ableism. It is
from here that Ahmed begins to develop her own phenomenology focused on the
particularity of the encounter with others rather than an other as such. For Ahmed, an
encounter is a meeting that involves surprise and conflict involving the “coming together
of at least two elements” (6-7, italics original). The fact that Ahmed does not limit the
encounter to two human subjects, but leaves it open as simply a contact between
“elements,” will be crucial in Chapter Three, which deploys her theories in relation to
medicine’s encounter with literary texts. Such a meeting also involves surprise insofar as
there is an “absence of knowledge that would allow one to control the encounter, or
predict its outcome” (8). This moment of surprise (understood as an absence of
knowledge and hence expectation/control) is fundamental to both Ahmed and Levinas’
phenomenological descriptions of an ethical encounter with the/an other, albeit in subtly
yet significantly different ways. Whereas Levinas’ phenomenology describes the other
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itself as prior to ontology and knowledge, Ahmed’s phenomenology describes the
encounter with others as prior to ontology and knowledge. And whereas Levinas locates
the ethical possibility of surprise as an absence of knowledge about the other, Ahmed
locates surprise as an absence of knowledge about the encounter with others.

2.2.2

What Ahmed Offers Medicine’s Encounters with Patients

Ahmed brings this much-needed particularity back into Levinas’ phenomenology by
making sure to emphasize her concern with the particularly of encounters with others, not
the particularity of an other as such:

We can move our attention from the particularity of an other, to the
particularity of modes of encountering others. Such an approach would avoid
assuming that we can gain access to the individual expression of the ‘real’ of
her body. Particularity does not belong to an-other, but names the meetings and
encounters that produce or flesh out others, and hence differentiates others
from other others. (144, italics original)

This phenomenological shift away from descriptions of the other toward descriptions of
encounters with others is crucial to ensuring that Ahmed’s call for particularity does not
risk essentialism. Ahmed’s phenomenology allows one to critically consider how
difference (e.g. race, gender, ability, etc.) is produced and implicated in encounters with
others, without assuming that such differences are essential to others. This attention to
particularity without essentialism is crucial to theorizing a clinical encounter that can
critically and ethically attend to difference. Currently, medicine and health sciences more
broadly are mostly concerned with issues of difference when framed as social
determinants of health (SDOH), which the World Health Organization defines as “the
conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age. These circumstances are
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shaped by the distribution of money, power and resources at global, national and local
levels.”40 Health inequity is thus understood as the result of issues such as urbanization,
gender, racialization, or poverty. Yet SDOH are often only considered in terms of public
and global health agendas; that is, at the generalized level of policy and program
development rather than the particular level of the face-to-face clinical encounter. The
problem with this uneven deployment of SDOH—as a conceptual framework for
understanding patient populations rather than individual patients—is that SDOH risk
getting construed in essentialist terms at the level of particular clinical encounters.
Clinicians risk treating differences (e.g. socioeconomic status, gender, race, etc.) as a
condition the patient has rather than considering how such differences condition the
encounter.

Ahmed’s phenomenology thus urges one to consider how difference, typically accounted
for by medicine as SDOH, always already conditions the very possibility for a clinical
encounter. I argue that an ethical clinical encounter requires clinicians to ask the same
kind of questions that Ahmed poses: “What are the conditions of possibility for us
meeting here and now?” (145). What conditions led not only to a patient’s illness but also
to the patient entering this particular clinical encounter? What conditions gave them
access to—or impeded their access to—this particular clinic or operating room or waiting
room? What conditions made it possible for this clinician to enter this encounter as the
one providing care? These are questions of historicity, yet for Ahmed attention to the
particular modes of encounter must also open up the encounter to a yet ungraspable
future: “we could ask, not only what made this encounter possible (its historicity), but
also what does it make possible, what futures might it open up?” (145). What future
possibilities might this clinical encounter open up—or even impede? What conditions the
encounters that the clinician and patient will have after the present encounter? What

This definition of SDOH, from the World Health Organization’s (WHO) website, is one of the most
commonly cited definitions in both research literature and educational materials. The WHO is mostly
obviously known for promoting health around the world by setting global goals, lobbying governments,
working with non-governmental organizations, funding research, and implementing healthcare related
programs. But the WHO also impacts health across the globe in less obvious ways, especially through
discourse as it defines and structures how people understand health in the first place.
40
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conditions the encounters that the patient will have with other others later on? It is
important to note that Ahmed’s questions of historicity and future possibilities are
characterized by a productive kind of failure—by the failed historicity of post-coloniality
in the former (11)41 and the failure to grasp the future in the latter (145). Such questions
do not point to history or the future as some kind of totalizing project that can be wholly
revealed or understood; rather, they point toward the incomprehensible complexity of an
other through the inevitable failure to ever wholly comprehend an other’s history and
future.

It is in this spatial and temporal movement beyond the present face-to-face encounter that
Ahmed locates “the possibility of facing something other than this other, of something
that may surprise” (145, italics added). Surprise (the moment beyond expectation and
hence knowledge) lies not in the other, but as something “other than this other.” Yet
again, Ahmed’s phenomenology makes sure to avoid essentializing the other as a strange
being, as someone one “knows as not knowing” because they essentially contain surprise.
Rather, surprise lies in the encounter. It is from here that Ahmed is able to develop her
theory of generosity:

a generous encounter may be one which would recognize how the encounter
itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of production and exchange
(how did we get here? how did you arrive?), but in such a way that the one who
is already assimilated can still surprise, can still move beyond the encounter
which names her, and holds her in place. (152)

Here we see Ahmed’s phenomenology at its best: her theory of generosity calls for
attention to the particularity of the encounter while still leaving space for an other to

Ahmed understands post-colonialism as a “failed historicity” because it “re-examines the centrality of
colonialism to a past that henceforth cannot be understood as a totality, or as a shared history” (11). In other
words, Ahmed finds post-colonialism to be productive in her work precisely because it reveals how any
attempt to historicize the present will always fail to some extent.
41
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move beyond such particularity—to move into new encounters which may yet again
surprise. As such, Ahmed can account for difference without claiming to grasp it fully.

In The Renewal of Generosity: Illness, Medicine, and How to Live (2004), Arthur Frank
also takes up Levinas, in tandem with the dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin, to develop a
theory of generosity in medicine:

If the stories I tell in this book need a label, I call them moral nonfiction, a
category best described by Levinas: “it makes a demand on me.” The written
text shows the reader a face that “looks at me and calls to me. It lays claim to
me. What does it ask? Not to leave it alone. An answer: here I am.” The moral
moment is when the text calls on the reader—on me—just as the patient calls
on those who offer care. The here-I-am of the writer is a generous offering of
self as witness… The dialogue of author and reader is the beginning of other
dialogues: in the multiple sites where medicine is offered and received, where
care is given, and where healing occurs. (86)

Yet here Frank (like Clifton-Soderstrom before) also slips from ethics to morality by
speaking of the “moral moment” when the text calls on the reader (even Frank’s title,
“how to live,” seems moralistic). In contrast, Ahmed opens her analysis of Levinas by
emphasizing how his writing importantly distinguishes ethics from morality: whereas
morality is a set of codes, ethics asks how one can encounter others as other (138). In the
opening pages of his book on Levinas’ Totality and Infinity (2015), William Large also
makes sure to emphasize that Levinas is writing about ethics and not morals: whereas
morality is the laws and principles by which one might live by, ethics is the encounter
with the other (2). The danger with such a mis-reading of Levinas’ ethics as morals is that
it closes off the encounter with others through moral prescriptions rather than opening it
up through ethical questions. Whereas Ahmed’s theory of generosity arises from many
questions about what conditions encounters with others, Frank’s theory of generosity
arises from the other making a singular demand upon the I (“do not leave me alone”),
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who then gives a singular response (“here I am”). Plurality and the possibility for surprise
are erased from Frank’s theory, thereby sedimenting and essentializing the other’s
position as other. For Frank, encountering the other (both patients and stories) is always
about the dialogical—about staying here in this face-to-face present for a dialogue, never
moving temporally or spatially beyond it to question the conditions that made such a
dialogue possible in the first place. Moreover, this static and essentialized account of the
other comes out of an erasure of difference: “alterity is an intrinsic quality of being
human […] it precedes such specific differences as gender, age, ethnicity, or state of
health” and this kind of alterity is precisely what “drives the dialogical relationship” for
Frank (115-16, italics added). This is not to say that the dialogical does not have an
important role to play in creating an ethical clinical encounter, but rather to suggest that
Frank’s theorization of the dialogical as driven by a fallaciously neutral alterity is highly
problematic. This fundamental lack of consideration for difference is precisely how Frank
can believe that merely witnessing and dialoging better with patients and stories is all
medicine needs in order to become generous and ethical—as if medicine’s ethical issues
with racism, sexism, or ableism can simply be resolved if physicians just have more
conversations with their patients or read more illness narratives.

2.2.3

What Ahmed Offers Medicine’s Encounters with Texts

I thus argue that medicine needs a more robust theoretical foundation for its ethical
encounter with its others (both patients and texts), which we find in Ahmed’s
phenomenological approach. As I mentioned at the opening of this chapter, Olivia Banner
importantly calls for a literary criticism that “elucidate[s] how ideologies of race, gender,
and disability inform social, political, economic, and institutional structures, which then
inform health and illness” (27). This is where a feminist phenomenological inquiry into
reading literature that depicts illness becomes crucial. For Ahmed, encounters with others
are not limited to encounters with other human subjects; rather, her phenomenology
expands Levinas’ ethics to consider how one may also ethically encounter the other as
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text. As literature is increasingly taken up for medical education and research with claims
of reinvigorating medicine with more humanistic, empathetic, and ultimately ethical
approaches to and understandings of illness, it is crucial to critically interrogate not only
how medicine encounters patients but also texts. The ability for literature to somehow
make clinicians more empathetic and understanding of their patients’ experiences is still
far too often taken for granted. As Banner forcefully argues with respect to racism, how
medicine takes up literature, as well as how it engages with those texts isolated from
historical, cultural, and political context, often reifies systems of power and otherwise
problematic modes of perception through the texts it chooses as its subject (mostly the
Euro-American male canon). Medicine thus needs to ethically encounter texts as well as
patients.

For Levinas, both literature and medicine totalize the other by representing it. Yet Craig
Irvine argues that this is precisely—and paradoxically—why literature is so important for
medicine: by mirroring medicine’s representational structure, “literature thus teaches
medicine, by example, to regard itself critically” (15). In particular, Irvine draws upon
Italo Calvino’s The Uses of Literature (1980) to argue that literature allows medicine to
recognize how language functions in more ambiguous and metaphorical ways than
medicine typically realizes. But Irvine takes for granted the self-reflexive criticality that
literature can offer medicine. While it is important for medicine to be broadly critical of
how language functions as a slippery system of signs, medicine must also be specifically
critical of how it represents the other in gendered, racialized, ableist, and other oppressive
ways. Not all literature will mirror medicine in a way that engenders such self-reflexive
criticality about such specific ethical-political concerns. Moreover, simply presenting
clinicians with literature that mirrors medicine’s, for example, sexist or racist
thematization of patients as others will not in-and-of-itself incite the radical selfreflexivity and re-orientation necessary to achieve a more ethical medical practice.
Rather, drawing upon Ahmed’s phenomenology, I argue that medicine must critically
engage with how it encounters such texts as others. Irvine concludes his essay by
asserting that “establishing the primacy of the ethical does not remove physicians from
the rocky road of morality: on the contrary, it reminds them that this is where they are
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placed” (17, italics added). Irvine’s ethics reminds medicine where it is presently
placed—in morally demanding encounters with patients—while Ahmed’s ethics demands
a more radical questioning of how medicine got to that place (encounter) in the first place
and what possible futures may arise.

2.3

Conclusion

So where does the transformative potential of literature lie, if anywhere at all? Just as
Ahmed argues that the ethical potential of the other lies not in others but in encounters
with others, I argue that the ethical potential of texts lies not in the texts themselves but in
encounters with those texts. This is how Ahmed gets around the fundamental problem of
essentialism in Levinas’ phenomenology (where alterity is figured as somehow
essentially contained within ‘the other’)—and this is also how medicine can develop an
ethics grounded in encounters with others (patients and literature) that attends to
difference without risking essentialism. Ahmed’s chapter on “Ethical Encounters” is
broken up with phenomenological descriptions of her own encounters with Mahasweta
Devi’s writing (translated by Gayatri Spivak). In these passages I find a compelling
example of how medicine may ethically encounter texts. Ahmed’s descriptions are
particularly focused on her encounter with the story “Douloti the Bountiful”: the story of
a peasant women who is sold into prostitution and becomes gravely ill with tuberculosis
and venereal diseases (Ahmed 153). Ahmed begins by describing the particular
conditions that made it possible for her to encounter this text in the first place, such as the
historical and colonial legacy of translation that made possible (and necessary) Spivak’s
translation of Devi’s texts (148). Yet Ahmed’s phenomenology of reading is not just
limited to critiques of the global publication and circulation of texts. Ahmed goes on to
also describe how “to touch your body [Doulati’s body] as the stranger’s body, to love
your body as the stranger’s body, would be to forget how your body has taken shape”
(160). That is to say: an ethical encounter with texts requires attentions to the conditions
(both within the text itself and beyond) that shaped this character as that which one
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encounters in reading. How is the body I encounter in the text structured through
particular figures and forms of writing? Through particular encounters with other
characters and even other texts? Through the modes of production and circulation of
texts? Through the prior encounters I bring to bear upon the text? Through the structures
of culture, history, and politics? Banner’s article on racism and reading in the medical
humanities importantly calls for “a mode of [literary] interpretation that illuminates
structural racism” and uses Audre Lorde’s The Cancer Journals (1980) as a notable
example of how structural racism has been problematically erased from her work by
medical humanities scholars’ (including Arthur Frank). By drawing attention to particular
modes of encounters with and within literary texts, Ahmed’s phenomenology allows one
to bring to literature a reading of difference enacted at both structural and individual
levels. I would argue that medicine would benefit greatly from this kind of literary
encounter as a way not only to enrich its encounter with patients and literature but to
make of this encounter something radically ethical.

The next chapter serves as a case study for the kind of literary encounter I call for. I
deploy the critical theoretical framework I have devlopped in this chapter to read Rawi
Hage’s Cockroach (2008), which depicts the clinical encounters between a mentally ill
refugee and his therapist. I have argued that literature has critical potential for medicine
insofar as it can help one recognize the politics of the encounter as encounter, rather than
only thinking about the identity politics of those involved in the encounter. I demonstrate
this in the next chapter by using the feminist phenomenological framework to trace how
humanity and inhumanity are conditioned through the novel’s clinical encounters, rather
than being essentialized facts of the patient’s or therapist’s identities. Deploying the
critical theoretical framework from this chapter in Chapter 3 inevitably brings us back to
the central concerns of Chapter 1 insofar as my reading of Cockroach also reveals how
the politics of evidence-based biomedicine condition the clinical encounter between the
refugee and his therapist.
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3

The Medical Inhumanities
3.1

Introduction

The call for papers for the Canadian Association for Health Humanities’ 2019 conference
asks “Cultural Humility and Contemporary Medical Practice: (How) Can the Humanities
Help?” and goes on to posit that the humanities “has the potential to redefine the
outcomes of culturally-focused physician training, rebalance the power dynamics
between physicians and patients, and to influence the quality of healthcare provided to a
variety of communities,” notably including refugees. This call for papers is just one of
many examples of the medical humanities positioning itself as the “cure” Western
biomedicine needs to better care for patients—like refugees—who are racially, culturally,
and religiously “other” to the hegemonically white, Western, and Christian medical
practitioner. My contention is that the medical humanities too often takes the humanities
for granted as a window into humanity: for example, that empathetic clinical encounters
are necessarily achieved by recognizing the patient’s humanity through attention to
narratives. This kind of logic, while well-intentioned, too easily assumes that narratives
necessarily reveal one’s humanity, that narratives always elicit empathy, and that
empathizing with another’s humanity is the ultimate ethic. Viet Thanh Nguyen argues in
his 2016 essay “On the Inhumanities” that a more radical ethics of recognition “demands
that we remember our humanity and inhumanity, and that we remember the humanity and
inhumanity of others as well” (97). My reading of Rawi Hage’s Cockroach (2008)
explores Nguyen’s provocation as it relates to the novel’s portrayal of the encounters
between a mentally ill refugee and his therapist.

Cockroach is set in the winter of Montreal and is narrated by its protagonist, an unnamed
male refugee from an unnamed Arabic Middle Eastern country. The novel begins after
the narrator’s failed attempt to commit suicide by hanging himself from a park tree. We
learn that he was rescued against his will by the police, forced to stay in a hospital for
some time, and then mandated by the court to attend sessions with a therapist named
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Genevieve. The novel depicts the narrator’s day-to-day life which primarily includes his
experiences with poverty, time spent with his mostly Iranian friends, his habit of breaking
into privileged people’s homes, and—most important to this chapter—his therapy
sessions. The novel’s title reflects how the narrator self-identifies as a cockroach and
oftentimes imagines himself transforming into the very vermin that privileged society
imagines him to be. I’ve chosen to analyze this text for how it reappropriates of the racist
stereotype of the refugee as vermin through its reappropriation of the social and mental
“illnesses” that society so often pathologizes: poverty and schizophrenia. In these ways,
Cockroach tempts a double criminalization of the narrator: first, as a poor refugee who
breaks into homes, and second, as someone with schizophrenia, a mental illness too often
criminalized by society. Cockroach rejects any empathizing impulse by readers and,
instead, leaves us to grapple with the narrator’s inhumanity as both a refugee and patient.
That leaves the medical humanities to grapple with a far more radical ethical demand: to
care for precisely that which rejects empathy—the inhuman.

Much of the scholarship on Cockroach notes the novel’s resistance to meta-narratives on
migration, refugees, or multiculturalism. Lisa Marchi, for example, argues that the novel
counters hegemonic representations of the “melancholic migrant, as a subject fatally
trapped within a deeply hurting past and paralyzed by nostalgic grief” as well as the
“successful immigrant who finds comfort and fulfillment in his/her new homeland” (50).
I generally agree with such readings, but am more specifically concerned with how the
novel’s rejection of the grateful and assimilable refugee meta-narrative depends upon the
novel’s rejection of the mental illness recovery meta-narrative. That is: the narrator
refuses to be a grateful, “productive” Canadian citizen precisely by refusing to be “cured”
by his government-mandated therapist, Genevieve. I first revise Nguyen’s ethics of
recognition by reading his theory alongside bell hooks’ 1992 essay “Eating the Other:
Desire and Resistance” and Sara Ahmed’s critique of Levinas in Strange Encounters. I
argue that a radical ethics of recognition does not recognize humanity and inhumanity in
ourselves and others, but instead recognizes how humanity and inhumanity are
conditioned through our encounters with others. Next, I read how inhumanity is produced
in Genevieve’s encounters with the narrator through her malignant desire to possess and
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consume his stories and emotions. I reveal how her desire is not really so different from
the narrator’s desire to possess and consume women and other people’s homes and
objects through his habit of break-ins and robberies. Finally, I trace Genevieve’s desire
for stories and emotions as part of an economy of encounters in which the narrator must
exchange stories and emotions for a supposed “cure” from Genevieve. This final section
reveals how capitalist economics condition the production of inhumanity in the narrator’s
encounters with Genevieve. Through this reading of Cockroach, I ultimately seek to
deploy an ethics of recognition that recognizes what conditions produce inhumanity in
encounters with others.

3.2

A Revised Ethics of Recognition

Nguyen contends that “identifying with the victim and the other in an act of sympathy, or
identifying as the victim and the other in an act of empathy, has the unexpected, inhuman
side effect of perpetuating the conditions for further victimization” (72). My reading of
Cockroach will reveal that victimization is not the only “inhuman side effect” of
identifying with or as the other; this sympathetic or empathetic identification also desires
to possess the other’s stories and emotions, especially painful/traumatic ones. In “Eating
the Other” bell hooks argues that contemporary mass culture’s desire for the Other and
Otherness (that is: cultural, ethnic, and racial difference) is not a result of political
progress, but the result of the successful commodification, consumption (“eating”), and
then forgetting of the Other and Otherness.42 hooks concludes her essay by asserting that

[w]ithin a context where desire for contact with those who are different
or deemed Other is not considered bad, politically incorrect, or wrongminded, we can begin to conceptualize and identify ways that desire
informs our political choices and affiliations. Acknowledging ways the
desire for pleasure, and that includes erotic longings, informs our
42

I capitalize “Other” here to reflect bell hooks’ capitalization of the term.
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politics, our understanding of difference, we may know better how
desire disrupts, subverts, and makes resistance possible. We cannot,
however, accept these new images uncritically. (380)

hooks is mostly concerned with erotic desire, but her argument still applies to the kind of
desire I am primarily concerned with in Cockroach and the medical humanities: a desire
to possess the other’s stories and emotions. In today’s healthcare context, where the
“refugee crisis” has made global health and culturally-sensitive healthcare particularly
“trendy,” there exists a desire for contact with patients who are different or deemed
Other. While many scholars have critiqued healthcare professionals and learners from the
“global north” who travel abroad to “save” Other-ed patients in the “global south,” there
has been lesser focus on how such desires to “save” play out when it is the patient, not
the practitioner, who travels or migrates to the “global north” (e.g. when the narrator in
Cockroach migrates to and becomes a patient in Canada).43 The medical humanities often
strives to encounter such patients not simply at the level of their diseased body (as
evidence-based biomedicine does), but also at the level of their illness narratives. Yet, as
hooks cautions with regards to erotic desire, the medical humanities must be critical of
how its own desire for patients’ stories risks “eating” the other’s stories.

In Strange Encounters, Ahmed uses eating as a metaphor to understand philosophy’s
encounters with the other: “we might consider the ontological encounter as a form of
eating and digestion: the other is valued as that which one is with, but only insofar as it
can be taken in by, and incorporated into, the philosophical body (or into the thinking of
being)” (139). Ahmed takes up Levinas’ metaphor of eating to distinguish between the
ontological and ethical encounter: the ontological encounter eats and grasps at others,
whereas the ethical encounter desires others. She goes on to identify that Levinas defines
desire as “beyond need and the assimilation of the other” so that his ideal ethical
encounter is that which “does not satisfy the ego – that does not fill it up – but which is

43

For critiques of volunteer medical missions abroad, see McLennan (2014) and Sullivan (2016).
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beyond its grasp” and that which “cannot be assimilated or digested into the ego or into
the body of a community” (139). But in my reading of Cockroach, desire is not so easily
separated from grasping and eating: the narrator’s desire often manifests as a literal
grasping at women’s bodies without consent, and Genevieve’s desire manifests as
consuming her patient’s stories and emotions, ultimately assimilating them within a
Christian and capitalist therapeutic model.

Nguyen, like Ahmed, is ultimately dissatisfied with how Levinas’ abstracted, idealized
ethics avoids the reality of encounters with others, for

[t]o deal with actual others, we would have to confront their lives, their
cultures, their particularities, their names, and so on. In doing so, we
would see that they are, like ourselves, generally self-interested. Their
self-interest brings with it the uneasy, contradictory contaminations of
worldly politics and histories. (78)

As such, Levinas’ other is an ideal kind of other that can be “desired” without the uneasy
contradictions that “contaminate” desire in the situated world of Cockroach—a literary
world wherein messy politics and histories make Genevieve’s desire for the narrator’s
stories a contradictory desire to both heal and consume him. Nguyen notes further that
Levinas’ abstracted ethics is never “explicit about adjudicating justice, or at least the
dirty, impure, pragmatic justice that actual others may care about” and instead Nguyen’s
“ethics of recognition aims not only at the utopian world of infinity but also at this
disagreeable and dirty world of totality” (78). As the setting of Cockroach, this is
precisely the world in which justice must be adjudicated. The narrator poignantly reminds
Genevieve that “pacifism is a luxury,” reminding us that while pacifism may seem like
the most just ethic in a “utopian world of infinity,” it is oftentimes untenable in the
“disagreeable and dirty world of totality” where violence is sometimes the only means for
the underprivileged to survive or get justice (Hage 98). The narrator seeks this
adjudication at the end of the novel on behalf of his friend Shohreh when he kills the man
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who imprisoned, tortured, and raped her back in Iran—a man who was otherwise free to
travel and do business in Canada without any repercussions for his horrific and unjust
actions.

But Cockroach also pushes back against Nguyen’ critique of Levinas’ inability to “deal
with actual others.” The narrator remains unnamed for the entire novel and his particular
city or even country of origin is never revealed, just merely implied as somewhere
broadly Arab. Nearly all the narrator’s “particularities” that we, as readers, get to
“confront” are revealed during his appointments with Genevieve—appointments where
he is quite literally confronted by a hostile, interrogative therapist who demands his
stories and emotions in exchange for her services/cure. The reader’s “dealing with actual
others” is thus mediated by Genevieve’s problematic desire to possess and consume the
narrator’s stories and emotions. As such, I wonder if Nguyen’s call to “deal with actual
others” by “confronting” their particularities is really a better ethical model. Instead, I
return to Ahmed to offer a more compelling model for bringing particularity back to
Levinas’ idealized, abstracted ethics. Ahmed’s alternative model cannot be understood
without first understanding that she is not simply critiquing Levinas’ abstraction, but
specifically his fetishization of the other: “To describe ‘the other’ as having the character
of ‘otherness’ is to recognise the other in a certain way: the other is abstracted from
particular others (the ‘the’ turning the other into an article of speech). Through that
abstraction, the other becomes a fetish: it is assumed to contain otherness within the
singularity of its form” (143).

This fetishization removes the other from “the particular and worldly encounters in which
beings are constituted in and through their relationship to one another” (143)—in other
words from the social, political, and material context that conditions the possibility of
encountering the other in the first place. From here, as discussed in Chapter 2, Ahmed
proposes an ethics that instead accounts for difference and particularity at the level of
encounters with others, rather than as something in the other. She offers the following
example: “rather than thinking of gender and race as something that this other has (which
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would thematise this other as always gendered and racialised in a certain way), we can
consider how such differences are determined at the level of the encounter, insofar as the
immediacy of the face to face is affected by broader social processes” (145). Thinking of
particularity in terms of encounters, rather than “actual others,” as Nguyen does, avoids
essentializing others as well as feeding the desire to consume others’ particularities
(“individual expression” or the “real” body in Ahmed’s terms). Reading Hage’s
Cockroach through Ahmed’s philosophy, which together argue for a revised account of
Nguyen’s ethics of recognition, we learn to read humanity and inhumanity not as
characteristics in the other, but as conditions that shape our encounters with others.

So far I have mostly considered subject-to-subject encounters. But both Ahmed and
Nguyen also consider how philosophy and theory, as bodies of knowledge, encounter
others and, in turn, how the philosopher or theorist or even literary critic, like myself,
encounters others through texts, like media, film, or literature. As such, I must not simply
consider the encounter between the narrator and Genevieve, but also my own
encounter—as literary critic and theorist—with the narrator through the text. More
specifically, I must be especially careful to not encounter the narrator as victim. This
caution informs Nguyen’s critique of Judith Butler44:

seeing the other only as a victim treats the other as an object of
sympathy or pity, to be idealized or patronized. Existing as the object of
or excuse for one’s theory or outrage, the other remains, at worst,
unworthy of study, and, at best, beyond criticism. Not critiquing others
and theorizing on their behalf further subjugates them by relegating the
real work of empathy to ourselves. (76)

Here, Nguyen is referring to Butler’s Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004)
wherein she demands, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, for mourning around violence and war to be
reframed such that it accounts for the loss of others.
44
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This is perhaps Nguyen’s most controversial yet important point: as a theorist supposedly
attentive to the concerns of others and otherness, one must also be willing to criticize the
other or else risk reproducing the other as a perpetually passive victim of not only
political violence or economic inequality but also of the theorist’s patronizing and
idealizing sympathy, pity, or empathy. Treating the other as victim misrecognizes as
ethical the theorist’s power as master of empathy. Or in Nguyen’s words, the theorist is
the only one who does the “real work” of empathy. Similarly, the medical humanities too
often uncritically positions itself as the master of empathy in healthcare—as the
discipline that can do the “real work” of empathy for a healthcare model that lacks the
necessary tools for empathy (e.g. insight into humanity through narrative). My point is
thus not to treat the narrator as an idealized victim of a broken mental healthcare model
(although in many ways he is), but rather to critically trace how humanity and inhumanity
condition the narrator’s encounter with the mental healthcare model as personified
through Genevieve. On that note, I will begin my reading of Cockroach with a critique of
the narrator’s treatment of women.

3.3

Reading Inhumanity in Cockroach

The narrator reveals what frustrates him most about his therapeutic relationship with
Genevieve early on in the text:

She did not understand. For her, everything was about my relations with
women, but for me, everything was about defying the oppressive power
in the world that I can neither participate in nor control. And the
question that I hated most — and it came up when she was frustrated
with me for not talking enough — was when she leaned over the table
and said, without expression: What do you expect from our meeting? I
burst out: I am forced to be here by the court! (5)
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The narrator’s outburst reveals that what Genevieve fails to understand are the
particularities of their encounter—that is: the conditions, like the court’s mandate, that
make their encounter possible in the first place. Meanwhile Genevieve’s question reveals
how she mistakenly thinks their encounter (“meeting”) is conditioned by the narrator’s
expectations, when it is actually conditioned by the exertion of power, like the court’s
mandate and Genevieve’s desire for the narrator to talk “enough.” What is left notably
unsaid is how “enough” is a fallacy that can never be attained since it depends upon
Genevieve’s insatiable desire for the narrator’s stories and emotions.

At the same time, the narrator fails to recognize that he does indeed “participate in and
control” some of the “oppressive power in the world”—specifically, patriarchal
oppression. His patriarchal oppressive power is most explicitly apparent when he assaults
Shohreh on their walk home from a party. The two start by gently wrestling in a
snowbank, but then the narrator tries to kiss Shohreh without her consent, pressing his
body down onto hers and not letting go of her face even as she repeatedly yells at him to
let go and tries to shake herself free from his grasp (74). The assault is described by the
narrator in a matter-of-fact tone that does not offer much reflection upon his or her
actions and feelings; he seems to move onto the next morning without giving the assault a
second thought. The only minor reflection he offers is when he describes Shohreh
shaking “her whole body violently” against his grasp (74, italics added): here, the narrator
characterizes Shohreh’s actions as violent while failing to recognize that he was the one
violently holding her down. The narrator’s encounter with Shohreh is conditioned by his
“oppressive power” and violence, not hers.

This scene epitomizes the narrator’s inhumanity as he not only acts violently towards
Shohreh, but also fails to feel anything in relation to this act. At the novel’s outset, the
narrator admits, “I need to seduce and possess every female of the species that comes my
way. When I see a woman, I feel my teeth getting thinner, longer, pointed. My back
hunches and my forehead sprouts two antennae that sway win the air, flagging a need for
attention” (3). By naming women as species, the passage introduces the reader to the
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narrator’s inhuman desire to violently possess and consume women, which, in turn,
dehumanizes the narrator himself as he transforms into a cockroach, a point to which I’ll
return later in the chapter. In the first instance, however, his malevolence extends to his
desire to possess others’ homes and objects through his repeated break-ins and robberies
across Montreal. And as we have seen, the novel also reveals the less obvious but equally
problematic inhumanity of Genevieve (and perhaps even us as readers): her (and maybe
even our) desire to possess and consume the other’s emotions and stories. So to adapt
Nguyen’s ethics of recognition: when we recognize the narrator’s inhumanity as the
desire to possess (women, homes, objects), then we can start to recognize Genevieve’s—
and maybe even our own—capacity for inhumanity as the desire to possess (stories,
emotions, etc.) as well. In this way, inhumanity is not an essential trait in the other, but is
conditioned by how one encounters others through a malevolent form of desire that seeks
to possess and consume.

Just before the narrator assaults Shohreh, a train passes the two of them and prompts
Shohreh to remark that trains make her sad. The narrator asks her why, but she refuses to
answer and instead asserts that “there are some feelings that are only one’s own” (74).
Shohreh’s possession of her own feelings lies in stark opposition to Genevieve’s desire to
possess the narrator’s feelings. In their therapeutic encounters, the narrator’s feelings are
never his own; rather, they are Genevieve’s as she demands and expects explanations for
his feelings as though she has a right to them, as though they are hers. She even assigns
feelings to the narrator as though she is the one who possesses emotions in the first place
and so controls how she distributes them among her patients. To the narrator, however,
this process feels utterly arbitrary even as it asserts its domination:

She always started with an assessment: you look tired, happy, sad, or
good. And I knew her words had no relevance, no connection to how I
looked; they were always just an excuse to start the conversation. I
usually nodded and I always agreed, but I also knew I could look like
all of the above at the same time, as if I were a cocktail of emotion that
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was not defined, that had no scientific term, that needed a new space to
exist in, a kind of purgatory that no medical paper had ever described.
(257)

By assigning emotions to the narrator at the outset of every appointment, Genevieve
seeks to possess the narrator’s emotions in two ways. First, she controls the conversation
by asking questions that seek to break into the narrator’s mind. Second, she controls
whatever emotions she “finds” in his mind by defining them in terms of medico-scientific
categories. Genevieve thus controls the discourse in their encounter: she controls the
conversation as the one who asks particular questions that demand particular answers, as
well as the terms and interpretation of this conversation (i.e. Western, medico-scientific
terms). In another appointment, it is clear that she controls the therapeutic encounter
through a Euro-Western framework when she interjects “Nietzsche!” in response to the
narrator’s reflection that “Maybe [his] sister wanted to bring a fighter into this world”
(78). The narrator does not understand Genevieve’s outburst and she does not bother to
explain it to him because the narrator does not need to understand; it only matters that she
understands—that she remains in possession of—the narrator’s innermost thoughts and
feelings in order for her to determine and prescribe a cure.

More specifically, Genevieve seeks to control their therapeutic encounters according to a
framework of Christian redemption. The narrator describes this framework with his
typical sarcastic and dark humour:

you are going to confess something — something evil that was done to
you, something evil that you did. If you sit, wait, behave, confess, and
show maybe some forgiveness and remorse, you, my boy, you could be
saved. Jesus shall appear from behind one of those office doors in a
skirt and stockings, holding a file of lives in his hand […] Jesus knows
every thought in your head. (231-2)
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Like Jesus, Genevieve seeks to possess every thought in the narrator’s head, as well as all
her other patients whose lives she possesses in her files. This reveals the third way in
which Genevieve controls the discourse of the therapeutic encounter: she controls what
gets recorded from each appointment in her filed notes. Her desire to possess and control
her patient’s innermost thoughts is motivated by her belief that she can “cure”—or more
aptly “save”—her patients’ humanity by getting them to confess their inhumanity (i.e. the
“evil” thing that they did or had done to them). But it is precisely through seeking to
redeem the narrator’s humanity that Genevieve ends up revealing the inhumanity of her
own desire to possess and control the other’s emotions and stories, in much the same way
the narrator desires to possess women.

It is thus apt that the narrator describes his chair in Genevieve’s office as an
“interrogation chair” (47), which suggests a psychological violence inflicted upon
another with the underlying desire to obtain an admission of guilt or some incriminating
piece of information. During their final therapy session Genevieve tells the narrator, “you
have anger, you have guilt, and you have to deal with your loss” and that he attempted to
commit suicide because of his sister’s death, even though he repeatedly denies her
reasoning (258). This time, Genevieve is not simply assigning emotions to the narrator,
but also reasons for these emotions. As she continues to interrogate the narrator on how
he feels about his sister’s death, the narrator simply stays silent. Frustrated by her
unfulfilled desire to possess the narrator’s deepest feelings, Genevieve invites the narrator
to leave the appointment. The narrator does indeed take this opportunity to leave the
clinic for good, but not without first implying that he has broken into Genevieve’s home:

You lost your slippers. You can’t find your old slippers. [The
narrator says to Genevieve.]
It is grave, very grave, if you are implying what I think you are
implying. Very grave.
There is nothing wrong with offering some hospitality, I said.
I never invited you into my personal life.
No, but I went anyways.
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This therapy is over, she said. She looked deeply sad and
alarmed. (259)

This encounter is a striking inversion of their usual therapeutic encounters. Whereas
Genevieve is the one typically “breaking into” the narrator’s personal life, this time the
narrator reveals that he has literally broken into Genevieve’s personal life; and whereas
Genevieve desires the narrator’s most intimate feelings and stories, the narrator desires
some of Genevieve’s most intimate possessions, like her slippers and lipstick. The
narrator enters Genevieve’s life ununivited just as he never invited her into his life.

Nguyen’s ethics of recognition states that “When we recognize our capacity to do harm,
we can reconcile with others who we feel have hurt us” (73). Genevieve fails to recognize
her own capacity to do harm—her own inhumanity as she desires to possess the
narrator’s emotions and stories—and thus cannot reconcile with the narrator—the other
who has hurt her by breaking into her home and stealing her slippers. Cockroach thus
posits a radical ethics of caring for others, a radical model of hospitality that is figured by
letting uninvited strangers break into our homes, and in doing so, recognizing that we are
strangers who can—or already do—break into other people’s homes. But Ahmed
importantly cautions against ending our ethics there: “The model of hospitality based on
‘welcoming the stranger’ [or welcoming ‘the other’] assumes that to welcome the
stranger is to welcome the unassimilable: it hence conceals how that very act of
welcoming already assimilates others into an economy of difference” (150). Ahmed
argues that one must problematize such a model of hospitality by analyzing the
“economies of differentiation that already assimilate others as the strangers (which is
economic in the precise sense of involving circuits of production, exchange and
consumption)” (150-1, italics original). In other words: a radical ethics of welcoming
strangers to “break in” is only radical if one also recognizes how such an other as stranger
is never really anybody, but is rather an other already assimilated through an economy of
difference. In the case of Cockroach, the economy of difference is a “circuit of
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producing, exchanging, and consuming” stories and feelings—a circuit that is never
neutral, but is fueled by relations of power.

3.4

The Economy of Inhumanity in Cockroach

In another appointment, Genevieve asks the narrator if he wants to tell her more about his
childhood, and when he does not respond, she cautions: “If we do not move forward, if
we do not improve, I might have to recommend that you go back to the institution.
Frankly, you do not give me much choice with your silence. I have a responsibility
towards the taxpayers” (60). This encounter yet again reveals Genevieve’s inhumanity as
her desire for the narrator’s traumatic childhood stories manifests as a threat. Moreover,
Genevieve’s expectation for moving “forward” and “improving” reproduces the
hegemonic mental health recovery narrative: that after a mental health crisis (e.g. the
narrator’s suicide attempt), the “ill” patient must follow a linear, forward progression
towards a recovered state of “health” by accepting the “cure” offered up the Western
mental health model (i.e. the “talking cure” offered through psychology/psychoanalysis
and/or the pharmaceutic “cure” offered through psychiatric medicine). This time, the
narrator actually resigns himself to Genevieve’s demands, thinking to himself, “I will tell
her stories, if that is what she wants” (60). In his resignation, the narrator crucially
reveals how the hegemonic recovery narrative depends upon an economy of stories and
emotions: you must give up your stories and feelings to the therapist in exchange for her
to “cure” your mental illness. This reveals the fallacy of the state’s supposed beneficence
in using taxpayer funds to “cure” refugees, like the narrator, who may not be able to pay
taxes, but must instead enter into the capitalist economy of the therapeutic model by
spending the only other currency it accepts: one’s stories and emotions.

The narrator most strongly identifies Genevieve’s desire to possess and consume his
emotions when some spicy Pakistani food makes him cry and sarcastically consider
“getting a little jar, collecting [his] tears, walking to Genevieve’s office, opening her
door, and showing her the bottle” (142). The narrator then imagines asking Genevieve
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“Here—is this what you want? Here—these are my tears. Does that make me sane,
normal, cured?” (142). The narrator’s question may be rhetorical, but the triple
substitution of “sane, normal, cured” raises important questions. Does the equivalence
between sanity, normality, and cure hold true? Can one ever truly just be sane, normal or
cured as if they are final, stable states? What signifies sanity, normality, and cures in
society? And who decides how they are defined/identified? The narrator humorously
imagines gathering all his tears in little spice bottles and labeling them for Genevieve:
“tears from laughter, tears from spicy food, tears from pain, tears from nostalgic
memories, tears from broken hearts, tears from poverty” and wonders “why all cultures
demand tears. The industry of tears! Tears must be seen then buried. Even Genevieve
wanted my tears!” (143). Apart from representing himself as a kind of orientalized other
who trades in spice, the narrator also calls attention to the industry of tears, reminding us
how his emotions are part of an economy of exchange in his encounters with Genevieve
as she desires to consume those emotions.

bell hooks argues that “the commodification of difference promotes paradigms of
consumption wherein whatever difference the Other inhabits is eradicated, via exchange,
by a consumer cannibalism that not only displaces the Other but denies the significance
of that Other’s history through a process of decontextualization” (373). By offering to
bottle up his tears, the narrator commodifies (as spice), displaces (from body to bottle),
and ultimately decontextualizes tears from emotions. And all this must be done to satisfy
Genevieve’s desire for his tears—for his emotions—in exchange for the “cure” to his
mental illness. hooks then goes on to analyze the film Heart Condition (1990) and asserts
that the film “insists that white male desire must be sustained by the ‘labor’ (in this case
the heart) of a dark Other.45 The fantasy, of course, is that this labour will no longer be
“exacted via domination, but will be given willingly” (374). In Cockroach, Genevieve’s
desire to consume the other’s stories and emotions must be sustained by the literal

45

Heart Condition is a comedy directed and written by James Dr. Parriot. It is about a racist police officer
who receives a heart transplant from a Black lawyer he hates. After the transplant, the lawyer continues to
haunt the officer as a ghost.
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(putting tears in spice bottles) and figurative (bottling up feelings) emotional labour of
the narrator and her patients more generally. The narrator thus imagines (literally
fantasizes) Genevieve’s fantasy that such labour is voluntary.

During yet another appointment, Genevieve asks the narrator how he feels about his sister
sleeping with the man she works for, and the narrator responds, “Nothing. I felt nothing”
(139). Genevieve then questions his feeling of nothingness until the narrator retorts, “I
am asking you, doctor…Genevieve. How are we supposed to feel?” (139). When
Genevieve vaguely answers that “it depends,” the narrator completes her sentence by
remarking that “it depends on class” (139-40) and thus, in the first place, upon material
economic circumstances as well as emotional currency. Genevieve fails to recognize how
economics condition her encounters with the narrator, especially what emotions she
desires from him in these encounters. Economic circumstances condition how the
narrator feels, but also his experience of mental illness, which Genevieve also fails to
recognize. Genevieve warns the narrator that drugs might be triggers for episodes of
delusion and delirium, which the narrator denies ever having experienced (166). It is
tempting to follow Genevieve’s lead to diagnose the narrator’s experiences as a
cockroach, for drugs do seem to trigger his episodes of delusion and delirium. For
example, slightly later than the early depiction of the narrator as a cockroach who
menaces, Hage describes him as transformed into a cockroach after smoking a joint: “I
lay in bed and let the smoke enter me undiluted. I let it grow me wings and many legs”
(19). After seeing his six legs and whiskered face in the mirror, the narrator tucks himself
into bed to think about the “dilemma” he faces (19). Again, the narrator may be
delusional, but at the same time that the transformation offers a momentary release from
the reality of his life, the episode makes it clear that his real dilemma remains poverty:
“My welfare cheque was ten days away. I was out of dope. My kitchen had only rice and
leftovers and crawling insects that would outlive me on Doomsday” (19). The reason the
narrator lit a joint in the first place was to warm his body in his unheated apartment.
Thus, as much as he dehumanizes women, he is also himself dehumanized by the welfare
system, which is described poignantly when he goes to the welfare office to fill out some
papers because “the bureaucrats want to make sure that you move your ass out of bed
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once in a while, shuffle your feet in the snow to prove that you are alive” (121). The
novel thus highlights how poverty conditions the narrator’s inhumanity—his inability to
feel what he is “supposed” to feel and his transformations into a cockroach.

There is, however, one way in which Genevieve seems to recognize that economics
conditions the narrator’s feelings and mental illness: in order to progress towards
“recovery,” Genevieve strongly believes that the narrator must get a job. For example,
when the narrator tells Genevieve that he interviewed to be a server at an Iranian
restaurant, she enthusiastically responds, “It will be such a good step for you to
reintegrate into society” (76). Genevieve’s remark implies that currently the narrator is
not integrated into society and it is unclear whether this is because he is a poor,
unemployed refugee or because he is a mentally ill man who thinks he is part cockroach.
This ambiguity is precisely the novel’s point as the narrator’s experiences as a refugee in
poverty cannot be separated from his experiences with illness. But one must be careful
not to mistake this intersectional approach to healthcare with Genevieve’s remedy that
the narrator must be triply “cured” of his poverty, his refugee status, and his mental
illness, rather than recognizing that it is in fact society that is “sick” in the way it treats
the poor, refugees, and the mentally ill. Genevieve’s problematic understanding of how
poverty and illness are intimately intertwined comes out most clearly when she tells the
narrator that if he had a job, he could have afforded to buy a gun to kill himself with (79).
Participating in the capitalist economy (e.g. by getting a job) is thus revealed for what it
really is: a poison for the patient that simultaneously functions as a nefarious “cure” for a
society that seeks to eliminate the “sickness” from its body politic—in this case the poor,
the mentally ill, and the refugees.

The use of prescription drugs in the novel also functions in this way: the drugs are really
only a “cure” for a society that seeks to render the mentally ill invisible. The narrator is
warned about pharmaceuticals by a woman whom he knew from the psychiatric
institution and who now takes six pills a day (148). This woman warns the narrator not to
take any pills because “they will transform you into what you are not” and they will make
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you “believe that you don’t exist unless you look at yourself in a mirror. You will
disappear and the only thing you will be able to see is your clothes” (153). These drugs,
like the invisible mirror and mirroring of the technological apparatus in Benjamin’s
essay, not only render the mentally ill invisible to society by numbing them enough to be
assimilated into “normal” life (like the woman who now seems “normal” in her job at a
clothing store), but they also render the mentally ill invisible to themselves. This reveals
how prior encounters that produced inhumanity (e.g. the woman’s encounters with
psychiatrists at the institution) ultimately condition the other’s encounter with herself: the
woman now encounters herself as inhuman—as nothing but the clothes that covered
where her human body should be.

3.5

Conclusion

After the narrator finishes recounting one of his most painful life stories to Genevieve, he
asks if she is shocked by it. Genevieve replies: “Believe me, nothing surprises me in this
job. People come with all kinds of stories” (103). The possibility of surprise is
conditioned out of Genevieve’s encounters with patients; she has already consumed so
many patients’ stories that she can now quickly assimilate each new patient’s story, like
the narrator’s, before there is even a chance for surprise. As a result, Genevieve’s desire
for stories does not open her up to new perspectives or ways of being; her desire merely
feeds her control over the encounter. Ahmed considers how a truly generous, or ethical,
encounter with others requires the possibility for surprise:

A generous encounter may be one which would recognise how the
encounter itself is implicated in broader relations and circuits of
production and exchange (how did we get here? how did you arrive?),
but in such a way that the one who is already assimilated can still
surprise, can still move beyond the encounter which names her, and
holds her in place. (151-2, italics original)
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An ethic that recognizes what conditions our encounters with others must still be humble
in its recognition; despite seeking to understand what conditions such encounters, one
must still be humble enough to recognize that one can—and indeed should—still be
surprised by others. Otherwise, one risks still assuming mastery over the encounter.
Works of art, like Cockroach, are perhaps at their best when they surprise their audience.
Nguyen concludes his essay by reflecting on Rithy Panh’s film practice and, more
generally, the role of artists in an ethics of recognition: “for artists, looking,
remembering, and creating art are themselves ways of recognizing the ambiguities of the
human and inhuman […] we need the artist as well as the philosopher to sketch for us an
ethics of recognition, to create for us a picture of the inhuman face” (99). As I conclude
this final chapter, I want to also emphasize this broader point: that we need not only
theorists, but also artists—like Rawi Hage—to not only create a picture of the inhuman
face, but to make us aware of what conditions our encounters with inhumanity in the first
place in a way that still surprises us—that still unsettles, defamiliarizes, and estranges us.
This thesis is ultimately a culmination of my surprising encounters with literature and
critical theory (I never expected, for example, to find Benjamin’s theory of art to be so
relevant to medicine). All the authors I have taken up have unsettled, defamiliarized, and
estranged my understanding of not only medicine, but also the humanities. As I transition
into medical school and eventually my career as a physician, the very least I can hope for
is that literature and critical theory will continue to help me be surprised by my patients
as I strive to care for them as ethically and generously as possible.

79

80

Bibliography
Ahmed, Sara. Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality. Routledge,
2000.
“About Social Determinants of Health.” World Health Organization, World Health
Organization, 25 Sept. 2017, www.who.int/social_determinants/sdh_definition/en/.
Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of
Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, pp. 1332-1360.
Banner, Olivia. “Structural Racism and Practices of Reading in the Medical Humanities.”
Literature and Medicine, vol. 34, no. 1, 2016, pp. 25-52.
Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning. Duke University Press, 2007.
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Translated by John
Osbourne, NLB, 1977.
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.”
The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other
Writings on Media, edited by Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, Thomas Y.
Levin, translated by Edmond Jephcott, Harry Zohn, The Belkmap Press of
Harvard University Press, London, 2008, pp.19-55.
Bleakley, Alan. Medical Humanities and Medical Education: How the Medical
Humanities can Shape Better Doctors. Routledge, 2015.
Bohman, James. “Critical Theory.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016,
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/critical-theory/.
Buchanan, Ian. “Constellation.” A Dictionary of Critical Theory, Oxford University
Press, 2010. Oxford Reference,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095633862
Buchanan, Ian. “Epic theatre.” A Dictionary of Critical Theory, Oxford University Press,
2010. Oxford Reference, https://www-oxfordreferencecom.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199532919.001.0001/acref9780199532919-e-222?rskey=dnOIEP&result=1.
Buchanan, Ian. “estrangement-effect (Verfremdungseffekt).” A Dictionary of Critical
Theory, Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Reference, https://wwwoxfordreferencecom.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199532919.001.0001/acref9780199532919-e-229.
Buchanan, Ian. “ostranenie (defamiliarization or estrangement).” A Dictionary of Critical
Theory, Oxford University Press, 2010. Oxford Reference, https://wwwoxfordreference-

80

81

com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199532919.001.0001/acref9780199532919-e-501#.
Burns, Lawrence. “What does the Patient Say? Levinas and Medical Ethics.” The Journal
of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 42, 2017, pp. 214–235.
Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. Verso, 2004.
Calderone, Karen L. “The Influence of Gender on the Frequency of Pain and Sedative
Medication Administered to Postoperative Patients.” Sex Roles, vol. 23, no. 1112, 1990, pp. 713-725.
Carel, Havi. Phenomenology of Illness. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Clifton-Soderstrom, Michelle. “Levinas and the Patient as Other: The Ethical Foundation
of Medicine.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 4, 2003, pp.
447-460.
Charon, Rita. Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness. Oxford University
Press, New York;Oxford;, 2006.
Chen, Esther H., et al. “Gender Disparity in Analgesic Treatment of Emergency
Department Patients with Acute Abdominal Pain.” Academic Emergency
Medicine, vol. 15, no. 5, 2008, pp. 414-418.
Crawford, Paul, et al. “Health Humanities: The Future of Medical Humanities?” Mental
Health Review Journal, vol. 15, no. 3, 2010, pp. 4-10.
Derkatch, Colleen. Bounding biomedicine: Evidence and rhetoric in the new science of
alternative medicine. The University of Chicago Press, 2016.
Ezenwa, M., and M. Fleming. “Racial Disparities in Pain Management in Primary Care.”
Journal of Pain, vol. 13, no. 4, 2012, pp. S20-S20.
Ferry-Danini, Juliette. “A new path for humanistic medicine.” Theoretical Medicine and
Bioethics, vol. 39, no. 1, 2018, pp. 57-77.
Frank, Arthur W. The Renewal of Generosity: Illness, Medicine, and how to
Live. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004.
Foucalt, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaelogy of Medical Perception,
translated by A.M. Sheridan, Routledge, 2003. Monoskop,
https://monoskop.org/images/9/92/Foucault_Michel_The_Birth_of_the_Clinic_19
76.pdf.
Fuller, Jonathan. “The new medical model: Chronic disease and evidence-based
medicine.” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016.
Goyal, Monika K., et al. “Racial Disparities in Pain Management of Children with
Appendicitis in Emergency Departments.” JAMA Pediatrics, vol. 169, no. 11,
2015, pp. 996-1002.
Hage, Rawi. Cockroach. House of Anansi Press Inc., Toronto, 2009.
Hansen, Miriam B. “Benjamin's Aura.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 34, no. 2, 2008, pp. 336.

81

82

Hoffmann, Diane E., and Anita J. Tarzian. “The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against
Women in the Treatment of Pain.” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, vol.
28, no. 4, 2001, pp. 13-27.
Hoffman, Kelly M., et al. “Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment
Recommendations, and False Beliefs about Biological Differences between
Blacks and Whites.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, vol. 113, no. 16, 2016, pp. 4296-4301.
hooks, bell. “Eating the other: Desire and resistance.” Black Looks: Race and
Representation. South End Press, 1992, pp. 21-39.
Hughes, Bee. “Challenging menstrual norms in online medical advice: Deconstructing
stigma through entangled art practice.” Feminist Encounters: A Journal of
Critical Studies in Culture and Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2018.
Irvine, Craig. “The Other Side of Silence: Levinas, Medicine, and Literature.” Literature
and Medicine, vol. 24, no. 1, 2005, pp. 8-18.
Jones, Therese, et al. Health Humanities Reader. Rutgers University Press, New
Brunswick, New Jersey, 2014.
Jorgensen, Larry M., “Seventeenth-Century Theories of Consciousness,” The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2014,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/consciousness-17th/.
Komesaroff, Paul. “The Many Faces of the Clinic: A Levinasian View.” Handbook of
Phenomenology and Medicine, edited by Kay S Toombs, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2001, pp. 317–330.
Kumagai, Arno K., and Delese Wear. “‘Making strange’: A role for the humanities in
medicaleducation.” Academic Medicine, vol. 89, no. 7, 2014, 973-7.
Large, William. Levinas’ ‘Totality and Infinity’. Bloomsbury Academic, 2015.
Leibniz, Gottfried W. New Essays on Human Understanding, translated by Peter
Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Leibniz, Gottfried W. Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel
Garber, Hackett Publishing Co., 1989.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity, translated by Alfonso Lingus, M. Nijhoff
Publishers, 1979.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Wemoi, translated
by R.A. Cohen, Duquesne University Press, 1985.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other: And Additional Essays, translated by R.A.
Cohen, Duquesne University Press, 1987.
Levinas, Emmanuel.Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, translated by Alfonso
Lingis, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

82

83

Lorde, Audre. A Burst of Light: Essays. Firebrand Books, 1988.
Lorde, Audre. The Cancer Journals. Spinsters, Ink, 1980.
Marchi, Lisa. “From the dark territories of pain and exclusion to bright futures? Rawi
Hage's Cockroach.” Canadian Literature, vol. 223, 2014, pp. 50-65.
Marx, Karl. Capital. Vol.1, Penguin Books, 1990.
McLennan, Sharon. “Medical Voluntourism in Honduras: ‘Helping’ the Poor?” Progress
in Development Studies, vol. 14, no. 2, Apr. 2014, pp. 163–179.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible, edited by Claude Lefort,
translated by Alphonso Lingis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968.
Montgomery, Kathryn. Doctors' Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical
Knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J, 1991.
Nelson, Maggie. bluets. Wave Books, 2009.
Nguyen, Viet T. “On the Inhumanities.” Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of
War. Harvard University Press, 2016, pp. 71-100.
Nortvedt, P. “Levinas, Justice and Health Care.” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy,
vol. 6, no. 1, 2003, pp. 25-34.
Olszynko-Gryn, Jesse. “The feminist appropriation of pregnancy testing in 1970s
Britain.” Women’s History Review, 2017.
Preciado, P. B. Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic
Era. Trans. Bruce Benderson. The Feminist Press, 2013.
Quaderi, S. A., and J. R. Hurst. “The Unmet Global Burden of COPD.” Global Health,
Epidemiology and Genomics, vol. 3, 2018, pp. e4.
Reiss, Julian, and Rachel A Ankeny. “Philosophy of Medicine.” The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
2016, plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/medicine/.
Sackett David L, et al. “Evidence-Based Medicine: What it Is and What it Isn’t.” The
British Medical Journal vol. 312, 1996, pp. 71-72.
Segal, Julie. “Breast cancer narratives as public rhetoric: genre itself and the maintenance
of ignorance.” Linguistics and Human Sciences, vol. 3, no. 1, 2008, pp. 3-23.
Sharpe, Michael C. and Patrick G. O’Malley. “Chronic Fatigue and Fibromyalgia
Syndromes.” The American Psychiatric Association Publishing Textbook of
Psychosomatic Medicine and Consultation-Liaison Psychiatry, 3rd ed., edited by
James L. Levenson, American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2019. Psychiatry
Online, https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9781615371990.
Solomon, Miriam. Making medical knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Sullivan, Noelle. “Hosting gazes: Clinical volunteer tourism and hospital hospitality in
Tanzania.” Volunteer Economies: The Politics and Ethics of Voluntary Labour in

83

84

Africa, edited by Ruth Prince and Hannah Brown, James Currey Publishers, 140163.
Strawson, Galen. “Against Narrativity.” Ratio vol. 17, no. 4, 2004, pp. 428-452.
Tauber, Alfred I. Confessions of a Medicine Man: An Essay in Popular Philosophy. MIT
Press, 1999.
van den Akker, Chiel. “Benjamin, the Image and the End of History.” Journal of
Aesthetics and Phenomenology, vol. 3, no. 1, 2016, pp. 43-54.
Viney, William, Felicity Callard, and Angela Woods. “Critical Medical Humanities:
Embracing Entanglement, Taking Risks.” Medical Humanities, vol. 41, no. 1,
2015, pp. 2-7.
Weinbaum, Alys E. “Racial Aura: Walter Benjamin and the Work of Art in a
Biotechnological Age.” Literature and Medicine, vol. 26, no. 1, 2007, pp. 207239.
“What Is Health Humanities?” SCOPE: The Health Humanities Learning Lab, University
of Toronto, accessed 28 May 2019, www.utsc.utoronto.ca/labs/scope/about/.
Whitehead, Anne and Angela Woods. “Introduction.” The Edinburgh Companion to the
Critical Medical Humanities, edited by Anne Whitehead and Angela Woods,
Edinburgh University Press, 2016, pp. 1-34.
Woods, Angela. “Beyond the Wounded Storyteller: Rethinking Narrativity, Illness and
Embodied Self-Experience.” Health, Illness and Disease: Philosophical Essays,
edited by Havi Carel and Rachel Cooper, Acumen, 2013, pp. 113-128.

84

85

Curriculum Vitae
Name:

Maryam Golafshani

Post-secondary

Western University

Education and

London, Ontario, Canada

Degrees:

2013-2017 B.A.

Western University
London, Ontario, Canada
2017-2019 M.A.

Honours and

Brett-Maclean-Peterkin Award

Awards:

2019

Province of Ontario Graduate Scholarship
2018-2019

Mitacs
Globalink Research Aware
2018

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Michael Smith Foreign Study Supplement
2018

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship
2017-2018

85

86

Gold Medal
School for Advanced Studies in the Arts and Humanities
Western University
2017

National Scholarship
Western University
2013-2017

Robert T. Jones, Jr. Scholarship
Robert T. Jones, Jr. Foundation
2015-2016

Related Work

Teaching Assistant

Experience

Western University
2016-2019

Research Assistant
Western University
2016-2019

Publications:
Moniz T., Costella J., Golafshani M., Watling C., Lingard L. (2019). “Bringing
Narratives from Physicians, Patients, and Caregivers Together: A Scoping Review of
Published Research.” Medical Humanities, Vol, Numbers.

86

